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Abstract 
This document contains the outcome of the first Human behaviour and machine 
intelligence (HUMAINT) workshop that took place 5-6 March 2018 in Barcelona, Spain. 
The workshop was organized in the context of a new research programme at the Centre 
for Advanced Studies, Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, which focuses 
on studying the potential impact of artificial intelligence on human behaviour.  
The workshop gathered an interdisciplinary group of experts to establish the state of the 
art research in the field and a list of future research challenges to be addressed on the 
topic of human and machine intelligence, algorithm’s potential impact on human 
cognitive capabilities and decision making, and evaluation and regulation needs. 
The document is made of short position statements and identification of challenges 
provided by each expert, and incorporates the result of the discussions carried out during 
the workshop. In the conclusion section, we provide a list of emerging research topics 
and strategies to be addressed in the near future.  
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1 Human behaviour and machine intelligence in the digital 
transformation project HUMAINT: objectives and 
workshop  
Emilia Gómez 
Centre for Advanced Studies, Joint Research Centre, European Commission 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
Over the last few years, thanks to an increase in data availability and computing power, 
deep learning techniques have been applied to different research problems related to 
computer vision, natural language processing, music processing or bioinformatics. Some 
of these models are said to surpass human-level performance (e.g. image recognition 
(He et al., 2015) and model highly abstract human concepts such as emotion (Kim et al., 
2013) or culture. The practical exploitation of such algorithms brings up a discussion on 
the impact of these algorithms into the ways human behave: 
 On one side, machine intelligence provides cognitive assistance and 
complement humans to interpret data more efficiently and discover hidden 
knowledge in large data resources.  
 On the other side, these algorithms may also affect the way we perform some 
cognitive tasks and thus affect autonomy and decision making. This is 
especially relevant when algorithms perform tasks in a high level of abstraction 
and when they may contradict and influence human interpretations.  
The goal of the Human behaviour and Machine Intelligence (HUMAINT) project, carried 
out at the Centre for Advanced Studies, Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission, is to (1) provide a scientific understanding of machine vs human 
intelligence; (2) analyse the influence of current algorithms on human behaviour and (3) 
investigate to what extent these findings should influence the European regulatory 
framework. 
This document summarizes the results of the first HUMAINT workshop, which took place 
in Barcelona on 5-6 March 2018, and brought together key researchers from 
complementary disciplines and backgrounds. The workshop was defined with two main 
goals:  
1. Build an interdisciplinary roadmap on human vs machine intelligence, potential 
algorithm’s impact on human cognitive capabilities and decision making, and 
evaluation and regulation needs. We intend to study the state of the art, identify 
future research challenges, and reach a consensus on practical way to address 
these challenges.  
2. Build a community of researchers for the HUMAINT project to collaborate with. 
1.1 Workshop details  
The workshop was structured in a set of short position presentations followed by panel 
discussions. Presentation slides can be found at the workshop web page 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/communities/community/event/humaint-kick-workshop.  
 
DAY 1 
9.00-9.30: Welcome (Jutta Thielen-del-Pozo, Vanesa Daza, Emilia Gómez) 
 
(1) Human vs machine intelligence 
9:30-12:00: Presentations 
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 Joan Serrà. Unintuitive properties of deep neural networks.  
 Gustavo Deco. Whole brain modelling and applications. 
 Karina Vold. Extended minds and machines.  
 Rubén Moreno-Bote. Slow and fast biases in decision making.   
 
12:00-13:00: Panel discussion. Presentation and moderator:  Ramón López de Mántaras  
 
13:00-14:00: Lunch 
 
(2) Algorithms’ impact on human behaviour 
14:00-16:30: Presentations 
 Henk Scholten. Digital transformation and governance of societies.  
 Nicole Dewandre. Artificial intelligence: an interesting leverage point to rethink 
humans' relations to machines…and to themselves.  
 Carlos Castillo. Algorithmic bias.  
 Fabien Giraldin. Experience Design in the Machine Learning Era. 
 
16:30-17:30: Panel discussion. Presentation and moderator: Verónica Dahl  
 
DAY 2 
(3) Evaluation and regulation of algorithms 
9:00 - 11:30: Presentations 
 Alessandro Annoni. Digital transformation and artificial intelligence: the policy-
oriented perspective. 
 Martha Larson.  Reality, requirements, regulation: points of intersection with the 
machine learning pipeline. 
 Anders Jonsson. Benchmarks and performance measures in artificial intelligence. 
 Ansgar Koene. The IEEE P7003 Standard for Algorithmic Bias Considerations. 
 Heike Schweitzer. Algorithmic decision-making - in need of (which) regulation? 
 
11:30 - 12:30: Panel discussion. Presentation and moderator: Xavier Serra. 
 
12:30-14:00: Lunch 
 
 (4) Application domains and new paradigms 
14:00 - 15:00: Presentations 
 Sergi Jordà. Enhancing or Mimicking Human [Musical] Creativity? The Bright and 
the Dark Sides of the Moon. 
 Miguel Ángel González-Ballester. Machine learning in healthcare and computer-
assisted treatment. 
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 Fabien Gouyon. The influence of machine intelligence on the music industry. 
 Blagoj Delipetrev. HumanAI. 
 Luc Steels. Will AI lead to digital immortality? 
 
15:00 - 16:00: Panel discussion. Presentation and moderator: Perfecto Herrera. 
 
16:00 - 17:00: Wrap-up session. Moderator: Emilia Gómez. 
1.2 Goals and structure of the report  
The goal of this report is to provide an interdisciplinary state of the art overview on the 
interaction between human and machine intelligence and identify which are the research 
challenges related to this interaction and the practical ways to address them.  
In order to do so, the document is structured in five parts. The first four parts are related 
to the four sessions of our workshop. Each part contains a series of original contributions 
and position statements provided by workshop presenters. They are complementary to 
their presentation slides and contain their statements with respect to a set of questions 
proposed beforehand. In addition, each part includes a summary of the workshop 
discussions provided by panel moderators. In part V, the report incorporates input from 
other scholars involved in our discussions that were not able to present at the workshop. 
The report finishes with some general conclusions of this interdisciplinary discussion and 
of the HUMAINT project and some directions for future research within the HUMAINT 
project and beyond.  
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Part I: Human vs Machine Intelligence 
In this part of the document, we address the following research questions:  
— Which are the fundamental differences between human and machine intelligence? 
— How do algorithms complement or replace human tasks now and how will they do this 
in the future? 
— Will algorithms that take over some of our tasks affect the balance between human 
and machine intelligence? 
We present a set of statements which address these questions from different disciplines 
and views, and provide a summary of discussions.  
 11 
 
2 Unintuitive properties of deep neural networks 
Joan Serrà 
Telefónica Research 
2.1 Statement 
Deep neural networks are currently a hot topic, not only within both academia and 
industry, but also among society and the media. However, interestingly, the current 
success and practice of deep learning seems to be uncorrelated with its theoretical, more 
formal understanding. In particular, we find a number of unintuitive properties both in 
their design and operation that do not have yet an agreed explanation. Interestingly, 
some of these unintuitive properties are shared with humans, although current neural 
network approaches and the underlying mechanisms that lead to those properties do not 
resemble human mechanisms. 
 Neural networks can make dumb errors — neural networks can produce totally 
unexpected outputs from inputs with perceptually-irrelevant changes, which are 
commonly called adversarial examples. Humans can be also confused by ‘adversarial 
examples’: we all have seen images that we guessed were something (or a part of 
something) and later we were told they were not. However, the point here is that 
human adversarial examples do not correspond to those of neural networks because, 
in the latter case, they can be perceptually the same (Szegedy et al., 2014). 
 The solution space is unknown — as with many other machine learning 
algorithms, the training of neural networks proceeds by finding a combination of 
numbers, called network parameters or weights that yield the highest performance 
or, more properly, the minimum loss on some data. There are well known 
methodologies to find such a minimum for a few parameters with theoretical 
guarantees. However, deep neural networks are typically in the range of millions of 
parameters, for which a suitable combination that minimizes a certain loss must be 
found. The losses of current deep networks are non-convex, with multiple local 
minima and potentially many obstacles (Li et al., 2017).  
 Neural networks can easily memorize — recent work empirically shows that 
finite-sized networks can model any finite-sized data set, even if this is made of 
shuffled data, random data, or random labels (Zhang et al., 2017). This has the 
obvious implication that neural networks can remember any data seen during 
training, no matter the nature of that data. What is not so obvious is that, still, if the 
data is not totally random, neural networks are totally capable of extrapolating their 
memories to unseen cases and generalize. Doing so when the number of model 
parameters is several orders of magnitude larger than the number of training 
instances is what is intriguing and contradicts conventional machine learning wisdom. 
 Neural networks can be compressed — one can drastically reduce the number of 
parameters of a trained neural network and still maintain its performance on both 
seen and unseen data (Han et al., 2016). In some cases, the amount of pruning or 
compression is surprising: up to 100 times depending on the data set and network 
architecture. Besides practical considerations, the compressibility of networks poses 
several questions: Do we need a large network in the first place? Is there some 
architecture twist that combined with current minimum-finding algorithms allows to 
discover good parameter combinations for those small networks? Or is it just a matter 
of discovering new minimum-finding algorithms? 
 Learning is influenced by initialization and example order — As with human 
learning, current network learning depends on the order in which we present the 
examples. Practitioners know that different sample orderings yield different 
performances and, in particular, that early examples have more influence on the final 
accuracy (Erhan et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is now a classic trick to pre-train a 
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neural network in an unsupervised way or to transfer knowledge from a related task 
to benefit from additional sources. In addition, it is easy to show that random 
initializations can affect the final accuracy or, in the worst case, just prevent the 
network to learn at all.  
 Neural networks forget what they learn — This phenomenon is known as 
catastrophic forgetting or catastrophic interference (McCloskey & Cohen, 1989). 
Essentially, when a neural network that has been trained for a certain task is reused 
for learning a new task, it completely forgets how to perform the former. Beyond the 
philosophical objective of mimicking human learning and whereas machines should be 
able to do so or not, the problem of catastrophic forgetting has important 
consequences for the current development of systems that consider a large number 
of (potentially multimodal) tasks, and for those which aim towards a more general 
concept of intelligence. Some research is devoted to tackle catastrophic forgetting, 
but a general solution for a compact model is still not yet fully in place (Serrà et al., 
2018). 
2.2 Challenges 
 Adversarial examples are a big challenge right now. Perhaps we are not going to be 
able to solve the situation until some of the other the inner workings of neural 
networks are properly understood. 
 Generalization is another principal hurdle. Current statistical theories for 
generalization are based on quite old models (like support vector machines and the 
like) that do not represent the state-of-the-art in many machine learning tasks. 
 A flexible and straightforward solution to the problem of catastrophic forgetting, 
especially considering limited resources. 
References 
— Erhan, D., Bengio, Y., Courville, A., Manzagol, P.-A., Vincent, P., & Bengio, S. (2010). 
Why does unsupervised pre-training help deep learning? Journal of Machine Learning 
Research, 11, 625–660. 
— Han, S., Mao, H., & Dally, W. J. (2016). Deep compression: compressing deep neural 
networks with pruning, trained quantization and Huffman coding. In Proc. of the Int. 
Conf. on Learning Representations (ICLR). 
— Li, H., Xu, Z., Taylor, G., & Goldstein, T. (2017). Visualizing the loss landscape of 
neural nets. ArXiv: 1719, 09913. 
— McCloskey, M., & Cohen, N. (1989). Catastrophic interference in connectionist 
networks: the sequential learning problem. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 
24, 109–165. 
— Serrà, J., Surís, D., Miron, M., & Karatzoglou, A. (2018). Overcoming catastrophic 
forgetting with hard attention to the task. ArXiv: 1801.01423. 
— Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., & 
Fergus, R. (2014). Intriguing properties of neural networks. In Proc. of the Int. Conf. 
on Learning Representations (ICLR). 
— Zhang, C., Bengio, S., Hardt, M., Recht, B., & Vinyals, O. (2017). Understanding deep 
learning requires rethinking generalization. In Proc. of the Int. Conf. on Learning 
Representations (ICLR). 
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3 Whole brain dynamics and model  
Gustavo Deco 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
3.1 Statement  
Whole-brain computational models aim to balance between complexity and realism 
in order to describe the most important features of the brain in vivo. This balance is 
extremely difficult to achieve because of the astronomical number of neurons and the 
underspecified connectivity at the neural level. Thus, the most successful whole-brain 
computational models have taken their lead from statistical physics where it has been 
shown that macroscopic physical systems obey laws that are independent of their 
mesoscopic constituents. The emerging collective macroscopic behaviour of brain models 
has been shown to depend only weakly on individual neuron behaviour (Breakspear and 
Jirsa, 2007). Thus, these models typically use mesoscopic top-down approximations of 
brain complexity with dynamical networks of local brain area attractor networks. The 
simplest models use basic neural mass or mean-field models to capture changes in mean 
firing rate, while the most advanced models use a dynamic mean field model derived 
from a proper reduction of a detailed spiking neuron model [see (Cabral et al., 2017; 
Deco and Kringelbach, 2014) and references therein for a review]. 
The link between anatomical structure and functional dynamics, introduced more 
than a decade ago (Jirsa et al., 2002), is at the heart of whole-brain network models. 
Structural connectivity data on the millimetre scale can be obtained in vivo by diffusion 
weighted/tensor imaging (DWI/DTI) combined with probabilistic tractography. The global 
dynamics of the whole-brain model results from the mutual interactions of local node 
dynamics coupled through the underlying empirical anatomical structural connectivity 
matrix. The structural matrix denotes the density of fibres between a pair of cortical 
areas ascertained from DTI-based tractography. Typically, the temporal dynamics of local 
brain areas in these models is taken to be either asynchronous (spiking models or their 
respective mean-field reduction) or oscillatory (Deco and Kringelbach, 2014). 
Adding the temporal dimension to standard FC analysis paves new ways to 
characterize the switching behavior of resting-state activity. However, the best 
methodology to assess it is still under debate. The most commonly used strategy has 
been to calculate successive FC(t) matrices using a sliding-window. Recurrent FC 
configurations are then captured by applying unsupervised clustering to all the FC(t)s 
obtained over time. However, the sliding-window approach has limitations associated to 
the window size, which affects the temporal resolution and statistical validation. 
Recently, new methods have been proposed to calculate the FC(t) at a quasi-
instantaneous level, namely Phase Coherence Connectivity or Multiplication of Temporal 
Derivatives, which allow for a higher temporal resolution with the caveat of being more 
susceptible to high-frequency noise fluctuations. To overcome this issue, we hereby 
propose to focus on the dominant FC pattern captured by the leading eigenvector of 
BOLD phase coherence matrices. The key idea of this task is to focus on spatiotemporal 
dynamical biomarkers instead of the classical static grand averaged biomarkers (e.g. 
FC): In concrete, both during task and at-rest, we will identify whole brain dynamical 
micro brain states, by clustering the dominant dynamic functional connectivity (FC) 
patterns captured by the leading eigenvector of those matrices. Recurrent FC patterns – 
or micro states – will be detected and characterized in terms of lifetime, probability of 
occurrence and switching profiles in link with the subjects’ performance on the Battery of 
behavioral tests, evolution of disease, and recovery. 
 
This type of whole-brain modeling could be used for crucial translational 
applications. The basic idea here is to exhaustively stimulate off-line a realistic subject 
specific fitted whole-brain model in order to detect which type and locus of stimulation is 
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more effective to reestablish a healthy dynamic of the whole brain (both under resting 
and task conditions) in order to expect that under that condition Hebbian learning will 
cause a meaningful recovery.  
Thus, multimodal neuroimaging (DTI, fMRI) is essential for having patient specific 
tailored whole-brain models which can be studied exhaustively. Whole-brain models 
could be fitted in particular by the novel spatio-temporal dynamical features mentioned 
above which characterize the network dynamics in probability microstates space. In 
parallel, based on healthy control groups, we can characterize also those same features.  
The idea is to discover, which kind of external stimulation (type and locus) would 
promote a transition from the patient specific affected probability microstate space to a 
healthy one. This study can be done exhaustively in off-line simulations. After that, one 
can try in vivo, with TMS, if those reestablishment of healthy spatio-temporal dynamics 
causes recovery. 
References 
— Breakspear, M. and Jirsa, V. K. (2007) Neuronal dynamics and brain connectivity. . 
In: Handbook of brain connectivity. pp. 3-64. Eds. V. K. Jirsa, A. R. McIntosh. 
Springer: Berlin Heidelberg, New York. 
— Cabral, J., Kringelbach, M. L. and Deco, G. (2017) Functional connectivity dynamically 
evolves on multiple time-scales over a static structural connectome: Models and 
mechanisms. Neuroimage, in press 
— Deco, G. and Kringelbach, M. L. (2014) Great Expectations: Using Whole-Brain 
Computational Connectomics for Understanding Neuropsychiatric Disorders. 
Neuron84, 892-905. 
— Jirsa, V. K., Jantzen, K. J., Fuchs, A. and Kelso, J. A. S. (2002) Spatiotemporal 
forward solution of the EEG and MEG using network modeling. Medical Imaging, IEEE 
Transactions on 21, 493-504. 
 
 
 15 
 
4 Extended minds and machines 
Karina Vold 
Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence and Faculty of Philosophy, University of 
Cambridge 
4.1 Statement 
While there are have been many astonishing feats by AI in the last decade—even in just 
the last year—there continue to be many fundamental differences between human and 
machine intelligence. For one, many of the headline-making accomplishments by AI have 
been in highly specialized domains, or in what experts call Artificial Narrow Intelligence 
(ANI). Humans possess a more general kind of intelligence. We must, after all, perform a 
wide-range of tasks in order to successfully navigate our complex environments. 
Specialists are working towards building Artificial General Intelligence (AGI)—machines 
capable of skilled performance in a wide range activities. But there exist fundamental 
differences between human and machine intelligence that may complicate this project. 
One difference that is often pointed to between humans and machines, especially 
amongst philosophers, is consciousness. There is nothing it is like to be a machine. 
Machines can be damaged, but they do not feel pain (Dehaene, Lau, and Kouider 2017). 
There is no uncontroversial scientific or philosophical theory of consciousness but, given 
the central role of phenomenology in human life and the success of our species, it seems 
at least prima facie plausible that consciousness has a cognitive function (for dissenting 
opinions see Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1982). In this case, without consciousness 
computers may never have human-like intelligence. 
Another fundamental difference is that human intelligence has a long evolutionary 
history. The physical world has put many constraints on human intelligence: our brains 
need to be small enough to fit through a human birth canal and light enough to be 
carried around on our necks. Furthermore, our biochemical processing speeds are slow, 
running on less power than a refrigerator lightbulb. This might have been useful when we 
had to conserve enough energy to scavenge for food, to build shelters, and to procreate, 
but computers do not have to do any of these things. Machines already process 
information more quickly and efficiently than the human brain (Reardon 2018) and all of 
their resources can be expended on one, very narrow task—hence their success in 
specialized domains.  
These differences raise questions about whether we could ever build humanlike 
intelligence, as well as why we should want to build machines that mimic our own 
intellectual constraints, especially if it is possible to bypass human intelligence entirely 
and leapfrog into what experts call ‘superintelligence’, which would surpass humans in 
many or all cognitive tasks. 
Humans have done remarkably well considering the constraints on our biological bodies. 
An increasingly popular set of views in philosophy of mind and cognition maintains that 
we have achieved cognitive success by finding ways of moving our thinking outside of our 
bodies. We created language, for example, a complex representational system that 
enables us to communicate ideas and build on them over time. We also created 
technologies, from pens and paper to smartphones, which allow us to augment our 
biological capacities and simplify the cognitive tasks our brains need to complete (Clark 
and Chalmers 1998). This points to yet another difference between human intelligence 
and machine intelligence: our cognitive functions crucially depend on our bodies, our 
environments, and our tools. Our intelligence, as it is sometimes put, is embodied, 
embedded, and extended. To attain human-like intelligence, machines too might need to 
be embodied (perhaps even in human-like forms), embedded in their environments, and 
able to extend their cognitive functions beyond their hardware through seamless 
integration with tools. 
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One concern that falls out of this idea that machines may move beyond their intended, or 
original, hardware base to make use of other tools to complete their tasks is whether us 
humans will become their tools of choice. We have already seen instances where the 
outcomes of algorithms have played a role in shaping human decision-making, e.g. in the 
application of risk-assessment algorithms in parole decision (Kehl, Guo, and Kessler 
2017). Ng (2016) argues that any mental task that a typical person can do in less than 
one second of thought can be automated, which suggests that the more difficult tasks to 
automate will be precisely those that require us to reflect. Tasks that we can do in less 
than one second do not require consciousness (Kahneman 2011). Human consciousness 
may need to play a key reflective role in complementing algorithms, but will have to do 
so while being guarded from the biases that influence our ‘fasting thinking’ systems.  
4.2 Challenges 
 Does it make sense to draw comparisons between human intelligence and machine 
intelligence?  
 Can these comparisons mislead us and even harm us? How can they be used to help 
humanity? 
 How is interaction with machines affecting human intelligence and cognitive 
capacities? Is it augmenting and enhancing our capacities (Savulescu and Bostrom 
2009), is it simply changing our capacities (Carr 2010), or is it perhaps diminishing 
them? 
 How can humans rely on the suggested outcomes of algorithms without being unduly 
influenced by them?  
 How can we prevent humans from being used, nudged, or manipulated by machines? 
And when, if ever, is relinquishing control to machines for the best? 
References  
— Carr, N. (2010). The Shallows: How the internet is changing the way we think, read and remember. 
London: Atlantic Books.  
— Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. J. (1998). “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58: 7-19. 
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5 Slow and fast biases in decision making 
Ruben Moreno-Bote 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra  
5.1 State of the art 
The brain is the only known intelligent system in the whole universe. It consists of 100 
billion neurons working together in intricate circuits to generate complex behaviour that 
allows adaptation and survival of the species. The study of the brain is important for 
clinical aspects, but also because it can inform and inspire new waves of AI. Also, 
knowing how it works will permit smoother interactions between humans and future 
‘intelligent’ technologies.   
An example of the benefit of studying the brain in AI is Deep Learning, which originated 
from early inspirations of theoreticians of the brain: the inspiration was that artificial 
neuronal networks consisting of interconnected non-linear units could represent 
increasingly complex ‘abstract’ variables. Thus, it is expected that new inspirations for AI 
will come from how the brain works.  
It is interesting to observe that algorithms for AI could be designed to work at high 
performance in specific problems, but do not necessarily generalize well to new domains 
or even new datasets. However, this is part the strength of algorithmic AI, as it is 
possible to design systems that work very well under well-defined and constrained 
conditions. This is beyond the scope of human brains, which are not designed to work in 
repetitive and highly constrained or restricted conditions. Also, search algorithms are 
more efficient in some respects than the human brain, especially when dealing with vast 
amounts of data in digital format, but not necessarily so in other formats.   
We think that it is important to understand human and complex animals’ behaviour in 
situations in which there is no a priori reason to expect that human behaviour can be 
worse than the algorithms designed by AI. For instance, in perceptual decision-making 
tasks, over-trained animals are expected to perform the task very efficiently, as it is 
typically observed. However, we observe biases from previous trials that affect 
performance. The presence of these biases is informative about how artificial the task is, 
and how much it deviates from its natural setting in which it was designed to operate. By 
knowing these biases, one can better compare human vs machine performance in 
situations in which experimental conditions can deviate from naturalistic environments.   
5.2 Challenges 
 Define tasks in which a priori there is no reason that subjects can do it wrong, and 
yet it is shown that performance is far from optimal, or biases are shown, or wrong 
tendencies are shown. 
 Complementary, design tasks that are naturalistic and in which human behaviour is 
highly adapted and close to optimal. Then test performance of AI algorithms in these 
naturalistic settings. 
 How biases can be eradicated from behaviour? Can machines/algorithms help to 
correct for this? Recent work shows that blocking of certain areas improves 
performance, as if the knob for biases could be removed.   
References 
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6 Human vs machine intelligence: an interdisciplinary 
discussion  
Ramón López de Mántaras 
IIIA (Artificial Intelligence Research Institute) of the CSIC (Spanish National Research 
Council) 
The Panel "Human versus Machine Intelligence" addressed several points based on the 
four presentations that we had right before the panel. Namely those of Joan Serrà on 
"Unintuitive properties of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)" (see Section 2), Gustavo Deco 
on "Whole brain modelling and applications", Karina Vold on "Extended minds and 
machines" (see Section 4) and "Rubén Moreno-Bote on "Slow and fast biases in decision 
making" (see Section 5).  
The panel started with some initial remarks by the moderator briefly relating the four 
presentations. The main remark was to point out the very big difference between the 
computational approaches based on deep neural networks and the real brain. 
Indeed, from the presentations of Gustavo Deco and Joan Serrà it was pretty clear how 
complex the structure and the functioning of the brain is and how poor and limited are 
the artificial neural networks (ANNs) are, including DNNs. The practice in DNNs relies too 
heavily on "trial and error" and this is why we do not really know why sometimes they 
work so well whereas sometimes they make so dumb errors. The gap between theory 
and practice is very large! DNNs lack explanatory capabilities and they suffer from what 
is known as "catastrophic forgetting" which means that they forget the task they have 
just learned as soon as they are trained to perform a new task. This last fact in itself is 
an indicator of the big difference that exists nowadays between human and machine 
intelligence.  
The presentation of Gustavo addressed the issue that the brain at "rest" (without stimuli) 
gives an output. So, the "resting" brain is in fact not resting and displays spatial patterns 
of correlated activity between different areas of the brain. In summary, from his talk, and 
the subsequent debate in the panel, we could see that the computational modelling of 
the whole brain dynamics is extremely difficult and extremely far away from the current 
computational models used in AI.  
From the talk of Karina Vold and the panel debate we could see other clear differences 
between human and machine intelligence, namely: consciousness, evolutionary 
history, embodiment, situated cognition (as part of cognitive extension), and very 
importantly social intelligence.  
Indeed, we, humans, are social agents and this fact obviously "shapes" and extends our 
intelligence. Such fundamental differences raise serious questions regarding 
whether the goal of building humanlike intelligence is possible. Another 
interesting aspect that was raised and discussed is that the technology we use can 
become functionally integrated into our biological cognitive capacities such that 
the tools become part of our minds on a pair with our brains (in the sense of what Clark 
and Chalmers call "extended minds") and how this can affect human intelligence and our 
cognitive capacities. Another related question is how we can prevent humans from being 
manipulated and if we should relinquish control to machines.  
Finally, the presentation of Ruben Moreno-Diaz was about decision making in animals 
and machines and particularly on the presence of slow and fast biases in decision making 
due to previously existing preferences and information (slow versus fast biases 
distinction is related to how long before the previous preference was chosen or how long 
before we had the piece of information that affected our choice). Given that we almost 
never start from an indifference state. One important question is whether we can avoid 
biases. The answer seems to be no in general. However, the biases can vary in strength 
and can be partially controlled. The strength of the biases seems to be related to how 
artificial the task -that is the object of decision- is, that is how much it deviates from the 
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natural setting it was designed to operate. One claim of this work is that thanks to the 
presence of biases we can better compare human with machine performance in situations 
where the experimental conditions deviate from natural environments. 
As a final wrap up summary we could say that the state of the art of machine 
intelligence is still extremely far from human intelligence and it is very 
controversial whether, in spite of the recent results based on deep learning, there has 
been real scientific progress towards the extremely ambitious goal of achieving human-
like AI. Another relevant question is: Do we really need it? 
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Part II: Algorithms’ impact on human behaviour 
In this part, we address the following research questions:  
— How do algorithms, when exploited in different applications, affect human cognitive 
capabilities? 
— How do algorithms have the potential to modify the way humans make decisions 
based on them (e.g. influence of recommendations, personalization)? 
— Which are the suitable strategies for effective human-algorithm interaction?  
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7 Artificial Intelligence: an interesting leverage point to 
rethink humans' relations to machines…and to 
themselves. 
Nicole Dewandre 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission 
7.1 Statement  
The understanding and effect of the expression "Artificial Intelligence" are strongly 
conditioned by the implicit assumption that intelligence is –ideally- THE specific human 
(male) feature. "Artificial Intelligence" is spoken of, either from a creator's perspective, 
i.e. with pride or fascination, or from a slave's perspective, i.e. with fear and resentment. 
In my contribution, I shall challenge both the creator's and the slave's perspectives and 
invite to a more agnostic and human-centric approach to AI. 
1. "Intelligence" is much more easily granted to artefacts than to humans. Ex1: A fridge 
is deemed to be smart when it sends a signal to inform about a lack of milk. When a 
man or a woman scrutinizes the fridge to check if there is milk, this is not considered 
a smart task. Ex2: Public lighting is deemed to be smart if it adapts to the type of 
user (pedestrian, car, bicycle). If a man or women was posted on each street to turn 
the lights on according to the type of user, this would not be qualified as a high-
skilled job! In fact, artificial intelligence is granted to artefacts reacting to their 
environment, when human intelligence is, instead, granted to behaviours gaming the 
environment, in order to reach an objective or materialise an intention. Mere 
reactivity, when it comes to humans, is not considered as intelligence, but rather as 
weakness. This leads to rethinking human intelligence, and the role of intelligence in 
characterising humanness.   
2. In some places, we need to be reminded we interact with humans and not with 
machines. For example, a sticker encouraging saying "Hi" before asking for a ticket 
reveals that the default solution might have become to get a ticket from a machine 
instead of from the hands of another man or woman. In the same vein, interacting on 
websites, humans are asked to demonstrate to machines that they are humans, for 
example, through CAPTCHA, to be able to pursue the interaction. This reveals a 
generalisation of the fact that human-machine relationships are more and more 
positioning machine in the active role and humans in the passive or reactive mode. 
This way to see things occults the fact that machines and artefacts are owned and 
developed by agents, corporate or humans. So, instead of considering the human-
machine interactions, the focus should be on human (owner/developer)-machine-
human (user) interactions. This leads to rethinking the radical changes in the way 
(smart) artefacts mediate human relations.   
7.2 Position regarding the research questions 
How do algorithms have the potential to modify the way humans make 
decisions based on them (e.g. influence of recommendations, personalization)? 
As the way humans make decisions is highly conditioned by their environment, and the 
environment being more and more pervaded by connected artefacts and algorithms, it is 
obvious that algorithms will impact the way humans make decisions. I would be cautious 
using the term "modify" as if there was a "before" and an "after" algorithms in the way 
humans make decisions. This question has to be addressed with the baseline of actual 
decision-making (partly contingent, depending from partial information, based on some 
random or serendipity) and not idealised decision-making (based on perfect, unbiased 
information).    
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Which are the suitable strategies for effective human-algorithm interaction? 
As suitable strategies might depend from addressing the users' perspective or the 
owner's perspective, I shall deliberately answer this question from the user's perspective. 
From the users' perspective, it is essential to protect the attentional sphere of the users. 
Potentially, connected machines and AI could cannibalise human attention to a point that 
human attention is totally "sucked up" by machines, and humans are prevented from 
directing their attention according to their own desire or to each other. I recommend 
focussing on the situation of users faced with multiple systems instead of thinking of 
each application separately. Besides protecting the vulnerability of our attentional 
spheres, it is also essential to re-create the conditions enabling trust, and making sure 
that fooling each other is not a winning strategy. Instead of addressing these issues 
through control, I would recommend a minima- recreating the conditions allowing each of 
us to know if he or she is in an environment which "recognizes" him or her, and what is 
the impact of this recognition. For example, when I look for a good or service on the 
internet, is the price which is offered the same that anybody else would be offered? And 
if not, what is the impact of the environment adapting to me (in this example, with 
dynamic pricing)?        
7.3 Challenges 
 Critical approach of intelligence: what it is; its role in characterising humanness; the 
articulation between intelligence, knowledge and power. 
 What is the effect of AI on human relations, and on the relation between humans and 
their environment (mix of artefacts and nature)? 
 What does AI not change? In other words, what are the invariants with the past? 
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8 Algorithmic discrimination 
Carlos Castillo1 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
8.1 Statement  
Statistical group discrimination is disadvantageous differential treatment against socially 
salient groups based on statistically relevant facts (Lieppert-Rasmussen, 2013). In this 
definition, a group is socially salient if membership is important to the structure of social 
interactions across a wide range of social contexts; this includes in particular categories 
that are protected by law, such as individuals with disabilities, and groups defined by 
properties that are a matter of anti-discrimination law, such as gender, age, religion, 
national origin, etc. Algorithms based on statistical learning can engage in statistical 
group discrimination, if we understand statistically relevant facts as any information 
derived from training data — indeed, there are many examples of this (Hajian et al. 
2016). Hence, the interaction between humans and algorithms should be one in which 
the human is able to not only understand but also challenge algorithmic decisions. The 
"FAT" framework (Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency) has been advanced in 
recent years as a set of characteristics to which algorithms should adhere. 
Recommendations 
 There is a need for more awareness of the limitations of algorithms and the extent to 
which they can do harm. 
 There is a need for robust evaluation frameworks that do not stop at abstract 
evaluation metrics (such as accuracy and precision) but that consider other elements 
of how an algorithm can affect the lives of people. 
 There is a need for mechanisms of effective algorithmic transparency, which is not 
mere access to source code but a degree of algorithmic explainability that enables 
humans to understand and challenge algorithmic decisions. 
8.2 Context 
Despite lacking “subjective” elements in their decisions, algorithms, particularly 
predictive modelling algorithms that are used to support decision-making, can be 
discriminatory. A more precise formulation follows. 
Generic discrimination  
This and following definitions are adapted from Lippert-Rasmussen [2013]. 
X discriminates against someone Y in relation to Z if: 
1. Y has property P and Z does not have property P (or X believes Y has property P 
and X believes Z does not have property P) 
2. X treats Y worse than s/he treats or would treat Z 
3. It is because Y has P (or because X believes Y has P) and Z does not have P (or 
because X believes Z does not have P) that X treats Y worse than Z 
In other words, generic discrimination is disadvantageous differential treatment. 
Group discrimination  
X group-discriminates against Y in relation to Z if: 
1. X generically discriminates against Y in relation to Z 
                                           
1 C. Castillo is partially funded by La Caixa project LCF/PR/PR16/11110009. 
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2. P is the property of belonging to a socially salient group 
3. This makes people with P worse off relative to others 
or X is motivated by animosity towards people with P, 
or by the belief that people with P are inferior 
or should not intermingle with others 
“A group is socially salient if perceived membership of it is important to the structure of 
social interactions across a wide range of social contexts” [Lippert-Rasmussen, 2013] 
A socially salient group could be, for instance, gay people. A non-socially salient group 
could be, for instance, people with brown eyes. 
Statistical discrimination  
X statistically discriminates against Y in relation to Z if: 
1. X group-discriminates against Y in relation to Z 
2. P is statistically relevant (or X believes P is statistically relevant) 
For example:  
 If an employer does not hire a highly-qualified woman because among his/her 
current employees, women have a higher probability of taking parental leave, 
then this employer is engaging in statistical discrimination. 
 However, if an employer does not hire a highly-qualified woman because she has 
informed him/her that she intends to have a child and take parental leave, then 
this employer is engaging in non-statistical discrimination. 
In statistical machine learning 
An algorithm developed through statistical machine learning can statistically discriminate 
if we: 
1. Disregard intentions/animosity from the definition of group discrimination 
2. Understand the “statistically relevant” part of the definition as any information 
derived from training data. 
Below, we provide five examples of discrimination in algorithms. 
Disparate impact. The model gives people with P a bad outcome more often, or in other 
terms, people with P experience a higher risk. 
Let’s assume the following table: 
 
Figure 1. Benefit for protected and unprotected groups. 
 
Suppose: 
"Protected group" ="people with disabilities" 
"Benefit granted" = "getting a scholarship" 
Intuitively, if: 
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a/n1, the risk that people with disabilities face of not getting a scholarship is much larger 
than c/n2, the risk that people without disabilities face of not getting a scholarship, then 
people with disabilities could claim they are being discriminated (see, e.g., Pedreschi et 
al. (2012)) 
Directly and indirectly discriminatory rules. A model associates attribute P to a bad 
outcome, or attribute Q which depends on P, to a bad outcome. 
Directly discriminatory rules  
Suppose that from a database of decisions made in the past, after applying an 
associations rule mining algorithm, we learn that gender = female ⇒ credit = no 
P(gender=female, credit=no) / P(gender=female) > θ 
This means we have found evidence of direct discrimination (Hajian et al. 2013). 
Lack of calibration. The same output translates to different bad outcome probs. for P 
and not P. 
A model lacks calibration if the probability of an actual bad outcome depends on the class 
and not only on the output. 
For instance, a well-calibrated model for risk of recidivism should have the property that, 
for every recidivism score generated by the algorithm, the probability of recidivism for 
different groups if the same. 
Disparate mistreatment / Lack of equal opportunity. The false positive rate of the 
bad outcome is higher for P than not P. 
Suppose we have the following distributions of scores (taken from ProPublica’s research 
on COMPAS in 2016, https://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis). 
 
Figure 2. COMPAS scores distribution. 
 
In the left plot, we see that the average score given to white and black defendants are 
different. This does not mean immediately that there is discrimination, but in the right 
plot, we observe that if we consider only those who did not commit a new crime (i.e., 
non-recidivists), the scores are still different. This gap means disparate mistreatment, or 
lack of equal opportunity. 
Unfair rankings. The model gives people with P a lower ranking. 
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Figure 3. Ranking comparison for different genres. 
The results above are Top-10 results for job searches in XING (a recruitment site similar 
to LinkedIn), for selected professions: “Economist”, “Market Analyst”, and “Copywriter” 
(Zehlike et al., 2017). We observe that there is a difference in proportions between the 
top-10 and the top-40 in the three cases. 
Algorithm-human interaction 
Humans need to be able to receive explanations, and to correct outcomes. 
Effective transparency does not mean source code, it means the human can understand 
and challenge the algorithmic decisions. 
For instance, in RISCANVI (the method used to predict recidivism in Catalonia), experts 
can correct the assessment generated by the algorithm, indicating, for instance, that in 
their opinion the defendant has a higher/lower probability of recidivism that what the 
system generates. 
8.3 Challenges 
A personal opinion on transparency  
 Many "customers" of algorithmic decision making systems do not value transparency. 
Transparency gives them insight on an algorithm and may generate doubts. Many 
want certainty, even if it is a false certainty. 
 This is a perverse incentive for developers/providers, who may exaggerate their 
claims of accuracy. 
 An additional problem is that numbers, plots, charts, suggest objectivity, so lack of 
mathematical literacy becomes problematic, as people tend to trust automated 
systems more than what they should. 
Challenges  
 We need good evaluation frameworks. How can this be fixed? Improving 
mathematic literacy and using evaluation frameworks that integrate multiple 
dimensions In addition to accuracy: "dollars saved, lives preserved, time conserved, 
effort reduced, quality of living increased" [Wagstaff 2012] and respect to privacy, 
fairness, accountability, transparency. 
 To the extent that algorithms can engage in disadvantageous differential treatment 
that leaves people of a socially salient group worse-off, based on statistical 
information, algorithms can discriminate. 
 Current research looks at trade-offs of utility and fairness and at mechanisms for 
mitigating unfairness. 
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9 Making quality decisions about the uses of algorithms and 
AI 
Verónica Dahl  
Simon Fraser University 
9.1 Statement  
How do algorithms, when exploited in different applications, affect human 
cognitive capabilities? 
While algorithms can be very helpful as extensions of the human brain, unregulated 
algorithms can tend to create cognitive dissonance between our true power as humans 
and our perception of it, by giving us a disempowering sense of: 
(a) subordination to machines: we must de facto submit to their modes of 
communicating, rather than vice-versa- e.g. call centers debug their defective 
speech recognition systems and decision trees for free at the public’s temporal 
expense (an instance of the “time theft” crime), often with no helpful end results 
and no possibility to reach a human. 
(b) uncertainty: decisions are often presented as unquestionable just because an 
impenetrable black box made them, leaving us unable to find out which criteria 
warranted a decision. This promotes either unwarranted blind trust or defeated 
resignation to uncertainty, not only among the general public but even in the very 
researchers developing or using the algorithms.   
How do algorithms have the potential to modify the way humans 
make decisions based on them (e.g. influence of 
recommendations, personalization)? 
Algorithms being morally neutral, like tools are in general, they can either be used to 
create a happier state of the world, or to perpetuate and deepen inequalities and 
injustices, placing us at greater risk of global catastrophe. In Toby Walsh’s words, the 
future is the product of the choices that we make today2. Given the speed at which AI 
advances unchecked and unregulated, we had better start foreseeing (and legally 
mandating) how algorithms and decisions based on, or made through them are bound to 
change the world, and how to best exploit them in order to gracefully adapt to the 
coming changes, that they may  be for universal good. 
Unfortunately, we are already cognitively prone to exhibit an unwarranted level of trust 
in algorithms when we make decisions based on them: we tend to treat information from 
an AI system as is it came from a trusted colleague, when in fact the system cannot even 
explain to us, like a colleague would, why it reached a given conclusion. A healthy 
skepticism is a must, as is the development of a proactive policy to address the 
potentially destructive consequences of algocracy (leaving decisions to machines), 
technological unemployment, and autonomous systems such as killer robots.  
It is a fact of life that algorithms will be more and more capable of making decisions that 
were previously made by humans, and in general, of replacing humans, whose salary 
demands cannot compete with the under-regulated way in which algorithms have been 
allowed to replace them. But with enough foresight and legal provisions, we can revert 
this situation in ways that lead to humans universally getting to do work we value, and 
leaving the less desirable aspects of jobs to machines. As a scientific community we 
could gather around this and similar goals in order to prompt and help legislators in 
bringing the needed changes to fruition, and ensure that the results of research in AI can 
no longer be captured by a few powerful players to the detriment of the public that 
largely funded that research to begin with. 
                                           
2 Toby Walsh (2018) Machines that think: the future of Artificial Intelligence. 
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Regulation should also be put in place to prevent humans in power positions from making 
poor or abusive decisions just because these are now made possible by technology, e.g. 
automated tax reassessments can now be made in blanket fashion and be sent 
massively, creating a mountain of appeals that remain unsolved for years, since 
employees can't keep up with their processing. The consequences are dire for those who 
need tax clearance to proceed with their lives. Many end up simply paying, from either 
need of clearance or attrition, the undue amounts exacted.  
Which are the suitable strategies for effective human-algorithm 
interaction?  
Effective beneficial human-algorithm interaction strategies require inclusive, democratic 
participation by humans in decision making. Algorithms should be subordinated to 
humans, serving them in such tasks as finding facts, proposing options and counting 
votes rather than making decisions that, because not collectively arrived at, cannot but 
be under-informed and biased. 
Proportional gender representation is particularly key to intelligent decision making3 and 
in general propitiates success for both sexes4. 
A good strategic bet for beneficial algorithmic interaction with humans might be to find 
and implement good automated methods for participatory and proportionally 
representative decision making, and adopt laws mandating governments to use these 
tools to obtain representative and specific mandates from the people as frequently as 
needed- at least for the most important questions that affect us all. The state-of-the-art 
in electronic voting allows us to ground democratic power in actual choice and consent. 
There is no excuse to continue the obsolete system of voting only once every X years for 
the blanket, static, and not even binding platform of some political party which often 
represents a minority when it wins. 
This single strategy of algorithmically enabling and legally mandating proportionally 
representative decision making, if successful, could then serve to generate all other 
necessary strategies to ensure that algorithms serve all humanity, by democratic and 
representative, automated universal vote: Should flawed and/or unaccountable 
algorithms be allowed to replace humans? Should robo-signed mass actions against 
citizens be legal? Should algorithms pay taxes and benefits like the humans they purport 
to replace would? Should our laws allow for results of publicly-funded research to be used 
against the public, e.g. by creating unemployment? Should algorithms contribute to a 
fund for retraining humans into new jobs? Should our right to information be cancellable 
by the use of black box algorithms?  
Even more importantly, this single strategy could also serve to generate the strategies 
that are urgently needed to push our Doomsday clock back from the two minutes to 
midnight it just hit: Should we all endorse the U.N.’s decision to ban nuclear weapons? 
What measures should be enacted towards ending violence, inequity, poverty, 
dominance, war, oppression, militarization, ecocide, climate change, etc?  
We may not have the political will, as a society that has not quite reached true and 
representative democracy, to collectively and representatively induce the intelligent 
decision-making processes needed. But at least the necessary tools for reliably and 
efficiently mechanizing these processes are within our reach. As a community of 
scientists, we can, at this point of urgent need, decide to develop them and promote 
them into use in interaction with all other concerned groups besides ordinary citizens: 
scientists, educators, health care professionals, governmental agencies both national and 
international, legislators, judges, politicians, grass-root organizations, etc. Regardless of 
what means are chosen, our scientific community is already taking action, cf. their 
                                           
3 https://futureoflife.org/2016/06/13/collective-intelligence-of-women-save-world/  
 
4 https://news.ubc.ca/2014/09/30/gender-equality-olympics   
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campaign urging a U.N. treaty against killer robots5, or STEM professionals’ initiative to 
more effectively manage technology and other resources crucial to human welfare6. 
   
  
                                           
5 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/09/killer-robots-pressure-builds-for-ban-as-governments-meet 
6  http://demilitarize.org/milex-sign-new-statement-climate-change-military-spending/ 
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10 Summary of the Panel Discussion “Algorithms’ Impact on 
Human Behaviour” 
Verónica Dahl  
Simon Fraser University 
This discussion tied together Henk Scholten’s talk on “Digital Transformation and 
Governance on Human Societies”, Nicole Dewandre’s on “AI as an interesting leverage 
point to rethink humans’ relations to machines... and to themselves” (see Section 7); 
Carlos Castillo’s on “Algorithmic Discrimination” (see Section 8); and Fabien Giraldin’s on 
“Experience Design in the Machine Learning Era” (see Section 9). The moderator’s brief 
position statement stressed as urgent the need to regulate algorithms, to ensure in 
particular that the wonderfully powerful tool that AI represents is used only for beneficial 
impact on human lives and behaviours. 
The main questions discussed were: 
 The need to debunk the view of rationality as the highest human capability, 
establishing in political terms the relational self as both free and social, so as to 
approach AI in a more human-centered (as opposed to control, malecentered) way. 
 The need to systematically develop a proper vocabulary and mindset that will allow us 
to define what we need to do, for whom, and with appropriate measures of how, if 
adopted, it will lead to a better state of the world.  
 The need to develop a vision of fairness in the digital world, and of what it means to 
evolve with AI in a socially-mindful, rather than interest-led, way.  
 The need to correctly conceptualize notions of fairness and privacy, which are 
sometimes incorrectly invoked for the sake of the rational subject’s interested wishes. 
While the separation line between using personal data for society’s benefit and 
protecting it as private might be sometimes unclear, a good rule of thumb might be 
that someone’s rights end where the rights of others begin, e.g. hiding behind 
encryption for criminal acts would warrant losing one’s “right” to such privacy. Where 
the separation line is really blurry, laws designed for partial compliance (as exist 
already in Europe) are usually preferable to algorithmically enforcing total 
compliance. 
 The need for transparency and accountability, defined as giving the public the ability 
to challenge an algorithm’s decision (N.B. this is different from having all details 
about the algorithm, which may be useless in terms of challenging it). At present, 
Software Engineering cannot verify whether our complex, often statistically-based, 
unpredictably but speedily evolving AI systems will behave as planned, but perhaps a 
way will be found in the future. Meanwhile it may be prudent to legally disallow 
algorithms that cannot deliver transparency and accountability where it is due.  
 The question of why are we being so suspicious or untrusting came up: it goes back 
to the degradation of human-to-human relationships under our globalized neoliberal 
economic politics, which normalizes human instrumentalization. For as long as 
“progress” means to use less people (improve labour productivity), and machines are 
being built to dispense with humans, it is “natural” for humans to end up wondering 
when machines will become “human”. A way out might be to legislate that the uses of 
(publicly funded in particular) AI must benefit, not hinder, the public, e.g. by making 
algorithms (in fact, those operating them) pay taxes and benefits, and contribute also 
to a fund for retraining into new jobs the people they’ve disloged. 
 The need to decide as a society, and legislate, who controls the results of AI, what is 
done in AI, and for whom. The absence of adequate laws for common good 
endangers modern political order, since a few very powerful global companies can 
profoundly influence many areas of daily life unchallenged, potentially generating 
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informational dictatorships able to manipulate the behaviours of humans and 
organizations alike, and even to erode representative democracies and world peace. 
Some possible strategies were also put forward: 
 We should define machine intelligence not by what exceptional people can do, but 
through valuing what is widely shared.  
 Protect the attentional sphere of the users from the demands of multiple systems. 
 Educate governments and the public about AI’s fallibility and limitations, e.g. neural 
net based systems cannot be totally autonomous given that they can have 
catastrophic failures embedded which cannot be anticipated until they occur. 
 Conjure as much, and as representative, citizen participation as possible for decision-
making on how to instrumentalize AI and technology in general for social benefit (e.g. 
7) . Many frameworks are possible, which must be balanced for efficiency and to not 
cause fatigue, e.g. as part of municipal bills of rights to be developed, or as machine 
assisted collective vote for the more critical issues (See more details in 8). Whatever 
the framework, proportional representation stands out as the crucial ingredient for 
generating the most intelligent decisions9. 
 Work with legislators to bring about the needed laws that will protect us from the 
main dangers of unregulated algorithms (such as technological unemployment, 
algocracy, killer robots), and will ensure that they are used to help solve humanity’s 
present problems for universal benefit rather than for that of a privileged few. 
                                           
 
8 George Monbiot (2017) Out of the Wreckage. Verso. 
9 https://futureoflife.org/2016/06/13/collective-intelligence-of-womensave-world 
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Part III: Evaluation and regulation of algorithms 
In this part, we address the following research questions:  
— How should algorithms be evaluated in a research vs industrial context?  
— Which are policy needs in terms of the usage of algorithms into real applications? 
— Which is the research needed to support these policy needs? 
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11 Reality, requirements, regulation: Points of intersection 
with the machine-learning pipeline 
Martha Larson 
Radboud University 
11.1 Statement  
Intelligent systems such as search engines and recommender systems play an important 
role in mediating our consumption patterns and our decisions. We use such systems daily 
in order to find useful documents in the large amounts of content available online, and 
we perceive their ability to greatly exceed that of a single human searching by hand. 
Today’s search engines and recommender systems go beyond documents such as 
webpages or books to also provide users with multimedia content (e.g., images, music, 
videos) and items, services, and opportunities in both the online and offline worlds (e.g., 
places to live, places to eat, jobs to apply for).  
At the core of search engines and recommender systems lie machine-learning 
algorithms. These algorithms can be considered recipes that take a large amount of data 
as input and provide predictions (i.e., a list of results or recommendations) as output. In 
contrast to conventional computer programs, it is not possible to know exactly what the 
output will be in a given situation.   
Search engines and recommender systems are considered intelligent since they produce 
in a blink of an eye a result that would have, in previous eras, taken a long consultation 
with a reference librarian, or a detailed discussion with the clerk of a video rental store. 
We experience these systems as doing something that humans are good at doing, doing 
it faster and doing it in an environment containing seemingly unlimited information. 
However, how do we know that these systems are actually working the way we 
assume they are working?  
In order to answer this question, we must evaluate the performance of AI systems. 
Upon first consideration, it seems easy to argue that it is impossible to evaluate search 
engines and recommender systems. As stated above, the very reason why we build such 
systems is because we find human effort alone would fail to find the results that AI is 
capable of generating. If we as humans are not able to find the “right answer” to our 
information needs, given a large collection of documents, how can we possibly know that 
what an AI system finds for us is optimal, or even correct? The issue is compounded by 
the problem of not knowing in advance the output of an AI system in a particular 
situation, due to the nature of machine learning. However, the dangers are clear: we 
cannot base our decisions and behavior on systems we are not sure we can trust to be 
doing what they are supposed to do. Giving up on evaluating AI systems is not an option. 
The way to proceed is to return to engineering best practices. In particular, we must 
specify a set of requirements for our systems, and verify that they meet those 
requirements. Ultimately, the position that it is impossible to evaluate search engines 
and recommender system is untenable because adequate effort has not yet been devoted 
to establishing requirements and to evaluating systems. The history of engineering is a 
history of finding solutions for problems that initially appear impossible. 
In order to come near the amount of effort it will take to apply engineering best practices 
to the evaluation of search engines and recommender systems it is important to admit 
the possibility that AI evaluation is actually more difficult than AI itself: If AI is smart, 
AI evaluation must be smarter. Human engineers created AI in the first place. There 
is no a priori reason to assume that they are not also able to develop procedures and 
processes that are actually “smarter than AI”. However, writing requirements and 
evaluating systems is a tedious and costly process, and must be recognized as such. If 
we are to insist on recommender systems and search engines that have been properly 
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evaluated and demonstrated to be performing according to specifications, then we must 
necessarily give up our assumption that AI is some sort of a shortcut or is necessarily 
giving us something for free.   
The return to engineering best practices will mean not just focusing on system output, 
but writing requirements for, and evaluating, every step along the machine learning 
pipeline (See Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Machine Learning (ML) Pipeline. Evaluation of AI with respect to requirements 
and opportunities for regulation can be identified at every stage of the pipeline. 
Formulating requirements for each stage of the pipeline requires considering the 
interplay of that stage with reality (i.e., with what the machine learning system attempts 
to capture). These stage-wise requirements provide detailed insight in what is happening 
inside an AI system. They can be seen as handles that allow us to get a grasp on the 
functioning of the system and to guide it toward desirable behavior and away from 
harmful behavior. The requirements represent an opportunity for regulation, which 
prevents machine learning from causing harm to individuals or society.  
It is important to be aware that requirement specifications are in the interest of 
industry, and that grounding regulations in requirements has potential to 
support compliance. Companies are highly motivated to work according to engineering 
best practices. A well-specified set of requirements allows a company to focus on its core 
objectives, and be sure that the resources it is using are being directed to accomplish 
these objectives. The benefits of requirements to companies using recommender systems 
can be seen in concrete requirements documents, e.g., (CrowdRec project, 2014) and 
joint industry-academic visions on evaluation (Said et al., 2012). Requirements also 
allow companies to understand how they can adapt to regulations, including both 
achieving compliance and updating business models. For example, data regulations might 
make it difficult to compete with respect to collecting users’ personal data (“Data” stage 
in Error! Reference source not found.), freeing the company from the need to devote 
esources to this area, and allowing it to shift its attention to competing with respect to 
algorithms (“ML Algorithm” stage in Error! Reference source not found.).  The 
ontribution of data protection law to the quality of data science R&D has been pointed out 
by Mireille Hildebrandt (2017), who states, “By requiring the specification of one or more 
legitimate purposes by the controller, data protection law unwittingly contributes to 
sustainable research designs that have a bigger chance of making good sense of the data 
than sloppy exploratory research that covers its tracks in the name of experimentation 
and the freedom to tinker.” Here, we point out that the positive impact of regulation 
promoting engineering best practices need not be unwitting.  
Each stage of the machine-learning pipeline presents its own challenges, and for none of 
them is it easy to write requirements.  For example, in the case of image search engines, 
training labels for image data (“Labels” stage) must incorporate the multiplicity of users’ 
perspectives on images (Larson et al., 2014)(van Miltenburg et al., 2017). Further, 
requirements for the stages may interact. For example, minimizing training data (“Data” 
stage) might speed up algorithms (“ML algorithms” stage) and promote user privacy 
(“Impact” stage) (Larson et al., 2017). 
Finally, we point out that “ML Team” and “Impact” are shown in Error! Reference 
ource not found. with a highlight intended to draw attention to the fact that machine 
learning starts with people (the people on the ML team that creates systems) and 
ultimately impacts people. Keeping people central in the ML pipeline requires investing 
effort into education. Education should include engineering best practices, but also 
encourage people to understand themselves and their personal worth in an era in which 
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more and more of our lives are mediated by digital technology, cf. e.g., the thought of 
Jaron Lanier (2010). Engineering best practices have the potential to remind us that AI 
may appear magic, but it is the magic of a magician: we enjoy the tricks, but 
realize that they do not change physical world as we know it. With time and 
effort, we can also break AI down into its component stages, specify the requirements for 
each stage, and evaluate and regulate it using those requirements. 
11.2 Challenges 
 Putting as much effort into designing the requirements for AI, and evaluating AI as 
we put into creating AI in the first place: concretely, this effort includes building on 
existing benchmarking initiatives and starting new initiatives. 
 Ensuring that the requirements for “Output” and “Impact” are consistent with fair 
treatment of user populations (bias elimination) and individuals (prohibiting harmful 
micro-targeting). This in turn means new requirements on “ML Algorithms”, but also 
on “Data” and “Labels”. 
 Ensuring that the next generation of machine learning scientists is trained with the 
skills necessary to apply engineering best practices to AI evaluation, and are also 
motivated to do so. 
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12 Benchmarks and performance measures in artificial 
intelligence 
Anders Jonsson 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the field of computer science that studies the automatic 
generation of intelligent behaviour from a computational point of view. The term 
"intelligent behaviour" is usually defined in terms of how difficult it would be for a human 
to perform a given task (Russell, 2009). Computational problems that are historically 
considered part of AI include reasoning, knowledge discovery, planning, learning, natural 
language processing, perception and the ability to move and manipulate objects. 
 
AI algorithms are mainly evaluated along two dimensions: 1) theoretical properties and 
performance guarantees; and 2) empirical performance.  
Historically, the two dimensions carried similar weight, and most AI algorithms were 
published on the basis of little or no empirical support. This has changed dramatically in 
recent years, particularly with the advent of deep learning (Goodfellow et al., 2016). 
Today, empirical performance is a major factor in deciding whether a given AI algorithm 
is published, and theoretical analysis carries less weight. In fact, most deep learning 
algorithms come with no performance guarantees whatsoever. 
Even though empirical performance is perhaps the most immediate measure of how well 
an AI algorithm works, theoretical analysis should not be overlooked as an evaluation 
metric. Performance guarantees come in many forms: an algorithm may eventually 
converge to the optimal performance level, or converge to a performance level that is 
within some bound of the optimal. Such an algorithm is guaranteed to always work well, 
no matter which task it is asked to solve. In contrast, an algorithm with no performance 
guarantees may perform very well on one task, but fail miserably on another. 
 
An excessive focus on empirical performance provides researchers with strong incentives 
to boost the performance of their own algorithm relative to other algorithms, since this 
means their algorithm is more likely to be published. Researchers often make strong 
claims about their empirical results, such as having "solved" a particular domain or 
achieving human-level or superhuman-level performance. These claims should often be 
taken with a grain of salt, and independent verification and reproduction of empirical 
performance is becoming an increasingly vital task in order to establish the correctness 
of published results and determine whether they carry over to other domains. 
 
Within the scope of empirical evaluation, there is also the question of precisely how the 
evaluation is carried out. In the case of stochastic algorithms that depend on random 
elements, a natural performance measure is the average performance across multiple 
trials, enhanced with a variance measure to test for robustness. However, researchers 
often publish the average of the K best trials, often without stating how many trials were 
carried out in total (Henderson et alt., 2017). The performance of deep learning 
algorithms is also highly dependent on other factors, such as the initial random seed, the 
values of hyperparameters, the network architecture, etc. Researchers often do not 
publish the details of how their algorithm was configured, making it harder to reproduce 
the work. 
To apply AI algorithms in real-world domains it is necessary to establish much more 
stringent evaluation criteria. Ideally, these criteria should be adopted not only by 
researchers implementing AI algorithms in real-world domains, but by most or all 
researchers in AI. In addition, publishing source code and data would make independent 
verification and reproduction much easier. These measures would make published results 
much more trustworthy and make it easier to determine which algorithms hold the 
highest potential for real-world problems. Often, relatively basic statistics are sufficient to 
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strengthen the aggregate results of multiple trials, compare different alternative 
algorithms, handle unbalanced datasets, etc. 
Another measure that typically strengthens published results is to establish a set of 
benchmark problems for a given domain. Sometimes benchmarks are accompanied by 
competitions in which algorithms square off against each other on a subset of the 
benchmark problems. Benchmarks are normally available to the public, and their purpose 
is to provide a much more unbiased system for comparing AI algorithms. The more 
benchmark problems exist and the more diverse they are, the more difficult it becomes 
to artificially boost the performance of a given AI algorithm. If benchmarks reflect the 
difficulty present in real-world problems, the performance of an algorithm on the 
benchmarks should have a higher chance of carrying over to other, similar domains. 
 
As an illustration of the importance of benchmark problems, consider the problem of 
classifying objects in images. State-of-the-art algorithms for image classification have 
been evaluated for many years as part of the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition 
Challenge, or ILSVRC (Russakovsky et al., 2015). From 2010 to 2015, the error rate of 
the winning algorithm at ILSVRC decreased steadily from 30% to 5%, which is similar to 
the error rate observed in humans. Since the datasets used for the competition are large 
and contain a lot of labelled examples for training and evaluation, and since many 
experiments have been carried out with humans acting as the classifier, many 
researchers conclude that state-of-the-art algorithms have become competitive with 
humans. 
 
Benchmarks are not without problems, however. Sometimes benchmarks do not 
accurately reflect possible real-world problems of a given domain, which may lead 
researchers in the wrong direction. Sometimes so much computational power is required 
that only a few select companies or organizations have the computational resources 
available to solve all benchmark problems. The prospect of winning a competition may 
also cause researchers to implement algorithms that do not really advance the state-of-
the-art. A common example are portfolios that are optimized to select between the most 
successful existing algorithms by deciding for example how many seconds of 
computational time should be allocated to each algorithm. 
Comparing the performance of AI algorithms with that of humans is not only of academic 
interest but effectively determines when it may be beneficial to replace human expertise 
with algorithms. An important aspect that affects the quality of such a comparison is how 
easy it is to measure success in a given problem. At least part of the reason for the 
popularity of AI in games is that success is very easy to measure. In real-world problems 
success may be much harder to measure, however. Eventually, as AI algorithms become 
better at high-level reasoning, new performance measures will likely be needed since 
success is not only measured by the performance on a single isolated task, but 
performance across tasks and how well the algorithm can integrate information from 
different tasks. 
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13 The IEEE P7003 Standard for Algorithmic Bias 
Considerations 
Ansgar Koene 
University of Nottingham 
13.1 Statement  
The rapid advance in the application of algorithmic decision making and machine learning 
methods to real-world applications, like screening of job applicate CVs, public-sector 
resource allocation (e.g. policing) and autonomous vehicles, with potentially significant 
impact on peoples’ lives has generated an urgent need for practical guidelines and 
industry (self-)regulation in order to ensure that the highest standards of responsible 
conduct are applied as these powerful new algorithmic systems are developed and 
deployed.  
A key challenge when it comes to the regulation of algorithmic decision making systems 
is that any evaluation of the bias/fairness of these system must take into account the 
inherently socio-technical context of how the system is (intended to be) used. When used 
for impactful decisions, the norms that an algorithmic system must obey are not just 
statistical, but also legal, moral and cultural [Dansk and London 2017].  
In recognition of these challenges professional associations such as the ACM and the 
FAT/ML community have responded by publishing Principles for Algorithmic Accountability 
[ACM 2017, FATML] and a Social Impact assessment statement for Algorithms [FATML]. 
Around the same time the IEEE launched the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of 
Autonomous and Intelligence Systems which is developing a document [IEEE 2017] and 
a series of ethics based industry standards aimed at moving the discussion beyond 
statements of principles toward practical standards and policies. 
13.2 Future challenges 
 There is a need for more multidisciplinary coordinated thinking about the ways in 
which algorithms impact individuals and society. 
 There is a need for clear assessment and certification regimes to communicate to 
users which algorithmic systems have implemented best practices for avoiding 
algorithmic bias. 
 There is a need for research on effective benchmarking and impact assessment 
methods, especially regarding social impacts that go beyond statistical assessment of 
disparate outcomes. 
References 
— David Danks & Alex John London (2017). Algorithmic Bias in autonomous Systems. In 
Proc. IJCAI 2017. Online: 
https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/ddanks/papers/IJCAI17-AlgorithmicBias-
Distrib.pdf 
— ACM (2017) Online: https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-
policy/2017_joint_statement_algorithms.pdf 
— FATML Online: https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-
algorithms 
— The IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems. Ethically 
Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and 
Intelligent Systems, Version 2. IEEE, 2017. Online: 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/ec/autonomous_systems.html   
 40 
 
14 Algorithms and markets: a need for regulation? 
Heike Schweitzer 
Freie Universität Berlin 
14.1 Statement 
Three main developments characterize the ongoing digitalization of the economy: (1) The 
increasing amount and importance of automatically generated data for the creation of 
new products and services and for the organization of all economic activities; (2) the 
development of ever more sophisticated algorithms to make economic use of that data; 
and (3) the rise of new business models based on data and its systematic analysis and 
use. 
These three developments fundamentally change the way we communicate, interact 
socially and act (and are treated) on the market. As a consequence, the existing social 
and legal order has come under pressure: Its ability to ensure the fundamental values of 
our societies – among them private autonomy, privacy and a sophisticated control of 
private and public power – can no longer be taken for granted.  
 As a reaction to the new explosion of data, data analysis capabilities – and possibly 
also “data concentration” – we have to rethink the informational order as it has 
existed in the past. This includes a rethinking of data protection rules as a new legal 
infrastructure for the functioning of markets, a rethinking of the role and 
responsibility of information intermediaries and the like. 
 The ever more widespread use of “autonomous agents” challenges our concepts of 
agency, responsibility and liability. We have to rethink the rules on decision-making, 
discuss the legal demands we want to place on decision-making by autonomous 
agents and the preconditions for attributing such decisions to natural or legal 
persons.  
 To what extent do we want to bind autonomous decision-making software to anti-
discrimination rules and/or other ethical standards? 
 If decision-making by self-learning algorithm resembles more  some sort of 
“intuitive”/unconscious decision making than a conscious/rational decision-making 
(Mireille Hildebrandt): To what extent do we require a rational justification of 
decisions based on transparent criteria such that their fairness can be subjected to 
legal control? When / how do we want to impose such requirements on private actors, 
as opposed to state actors? 
 We have to understand how the use of algorithms affects markets and analyze 
whether adjustments to the existing rules – in particular: data protection, fair trading 
and competition rules – are needed to safeguard their well-functioning and fairness. 
To make things more complicated, these three challenges are not separate, but deeply 
interlinked. We have to understand and handle the interdependency of orders 
(information order, decision making systems, market order). 
The goal must be a reconceptualization of these orders and their adaptation to the new 
challenges of a digital society and economy in a way that preserves the fundamental 
values that we continue to regard as the basis of our democratic societies and social 
market economies. 
14.2 Research questions 
The focus here is on how the use of algorithms affects markets and whether, due to such 
effects, new needs for regulations arise. 
In the currently ongoing debates, the focus is on three potential risks associated with the 
exponential growth of the use of algorithms in the marketplace:  
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(a) Algorithms can increase market transparency – will they thereby facilitate 
coordination among suppliers as well as buyers? Under what conditions? Product 
homogeneity and a small number of actors in the market are familiar factors. But in an 
algorithm-driven market environment, do we have to expect collusion also where product 
heterogeneity, innovation and heterogeneity of preferences prevail, and where products 
and services become more and more individualised? Do we need to adjust existing 
competition rules to deal with the risk of “algorithmic collusion”, namely abandon the 
distinction between “independent decision-making” and collusion, so as to cover parallel 
behavior also?  
(b) Algorithms can facilitate price discrimination among different buyers, possibly even 
enabling some sellers to approximate perfect price discrimination. Is this a challenge to 
the well-functioning of markets that the law should address? Does it threaten to 
undermine the general trust in the fairness of market-functioning? 
So far, the main task algorithms perform in the platform economy is to find the right 
match between heterogeneous products and heterogeneous preferences. In this regard, 
they “discriminate” according to preferences. There is a worry, though, that based on 
detailed personal profiles and an increased algorithmic understanding of “situational” 
power algorithms will offer the same products at different prices to different consumers. 
Will this do harm to the well-functioning of markets – despite the fact that, arguably, 
output will be maximized? What are the distributional consequences? What are the 
consequences for trust in markets? Can buyers self-defend against such uses of 
algorithms? Is there a risk of a costly “arms’ race”? Is there a need for transparency (a 
duty to disclose arguably already follows from unfair trading law) or for more intrusive 
regulation?  
Does competition law provide a layer of protection? In the “old world”, active consumers 
were meant to provide protection also to the lazy consumers. In a world characterized by 
personalization, this may no longer hold. Should competition law react by narrowing 
market definitions and expanding its concept of market power to cases of situational 
power? Or should private law react by specifying its concept of “bonos mores”? Can data 
protection law contribute to the solution of the problem, and if so: how? 
(c) Which principles apply to the use of algorithms by digital information intermediaries – 
and in particular: by digital information intermediaries with some degree of market 
power? 
The explosion of information needs to a new importance of information intermediaries 
that ensure an efficient matching of parties. What is the effect of these intermediaries on 
market functioning? The intransparency of matching algorithms may significantly 
decrease the risk of collusion between sellers in markets – all the more, since information 
intermediaries should generally not be interested in such collusion. Also, the presence of 
information intermediaries should lower the risk of consumer exploitation – at least to 
the extent that they offer a meaningful product and price comparison. New risks can 
arise when intermediaries themselves possess some degree of market power – either on 
the business side or on the consumer side; and all the more, if the intermediaries are 
vertically integrated. Do we need a generalized principle of “digital intermediary 
neutrality” to be implemented into the relevant ranking algorithms? or a principle that 
outlaws the algorithmic priorization of vertically integrated offers? A fiduciary duty of 
personal butlers (as a specialized version of information intermediary / agent) vis-à-vis a 
consumer using it? Are digital information intermediaries under an obligation to explain 
the ranking of their offers – in order to effectively outlaw discrimination and/or self-
priorization? 
(d) Primarily, markets are meant to ensure an efficient allocation of resources. In order 
to perform this function, a degree of trust in the well-functioning and fairness of these 
markets must exist. In the presence of algorithm-driven markets: Do we need new rules 
for ensuring such trust? Do we need to expand the existing anti-discrimination rules as 
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they apply also to algorithmic decision-making? Do we need new rules to avoid consumer 
exploitation in the light of potentially new degrees of information asymmetry? 
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15 Evaluation and regulation of algorithms: summary of 
discussions  
Xavier Serra  
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
The panel on Evaluation and regulation of algorithms included five presentations 
addressing different topics and addressing them from very different points of 
view. Alessandro Annoni, from the Joint Research Centre of the EU, talked about 
“Digital transformation and artificial intelligence: the policy-oriented perspective” 
where he explained the current and future policy EU initiatives related to AI from a 
regulation perspective. Martha Larson, from Radboud University and TU Delft, talked 
about “Reality, requirements, regulation: points of intersection with the machine 
learning pipeline” in which she emphasized the proper development of benchmarking 
for evaluating information retrieval systems (see Section 11). Anders Jonsson, from the 
UPF, talked about “Benchmarks and performance measures in artificial intelligence” in 
which he presented various approaches to benchmarking in AI from an academic 
perspective (see Section 12). Ansgar Koene, from the University of Nottingham, talked 
about “The IEEE P7003 Standard for Algorithmic Bias Considerations” in which he 
described the IEEE initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems and 
the different standards that are being developed under it (see Section 13).  Finally, Heike 
Schweitzer, from Freie Universität Berlin, talked about “Algorithms and markets - a 
need for regulation??” in which she introduced a legal perspective by emphasizing the 
challenges that AI technologies bring to lawyers, presented in Section 15. 
There was an initial list of questions that the organizers proposed for discussion: How 
should algorithms be evaluated in a research vs industrial context?  Which are the policy 
needs in terms of the usage of algorithms into real applications? Which is the research 
needed to support these policy needs?. There were some relevant contributions to 
these questions during the talks, but there was no time for discussion to address them in 
depth. A much more extensive and focused discussion would be needed. 
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Part IV: Application domains and new paradigms  
In this part, we address the following research topics:  
— Presentation of several application contexts where there is an interaction between 
human and machine intelligence and new future paradigms in computation.  
— Presentation of research areas that will have a future impact on how we understand 
machine intelligence.  
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16 Machine learning in healthcare and computer-assisted 
treatment 
Miguel-Ángel González-Ballester 
ICREA and Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
16.1 Statement 
Machine learning is in a phase of renaissance that is transforming practices in multiple 
fields. Beyond the application of previously existing techniques, novel developments in 
big data and deep learning have transformed the landscape of available methodologies. 
Furthermore, many of these developments are spearheaded by industry, which is leading 
the application of machine learning to everyday products and services, not least in 
healthcare. 
Image processing, in particular, has suffered a revolution in the last few years. Current 
methods based on deep learning clearly outperform the previous state of the art, and 
their extrapolation to medical image analysis has shown very promising results in i.e. 
lung cancer detection.  
Computer aided diagnosis is also benefitting from recent developments in deep learning 
and machine intelligence, particularly in enabling the analysis of large, heterogeneous 
sources of patient data, such as genetic tests, blood and cell samples, imaging 
explorations and unstructured information from the clinical history of the patient. 
Furthermore, these tools are also being applied to study the aetiology of complex 
diseases, by finding patterns in large patient databases. 
Despite these impressive initial success stories in medical image processing and 
computer-aided diagnosis, strong limitations have become apparent. Modern machine 
learning is predominantly based on “black box” approaches, failing to provide reasoned 
interpretations of the diagnoses they provide. Doctors (and we are far from replacing 
them) cannot afford to incorporate tools that provide a diagnosis with no explanation 
about the reasons behind this diagnosis. This poses a number of challenges for the 
widespread use of machine intelligence in healthcare. 
16.2 Future challenges 
 Interpretability is key to the future success of machine learning and artificial 
intelligence in healthcare. The combination of data-driven (empiricist) and model-
based (Platonic) approaches might be key to this end. 
 The availability of medical data is often limited by ethical and regulatory issues. 
Current trends in data augmentation and generative networks partly help in 
increasing the numbers of available data, but they risk biasing databases with 
unrealistic (non-disease related) information. 
 Embodiment of artificial intelligence for patient care, e.g. through surgical robots, 
robot companions for the aged, or pervasive access and monitoring of health 
information, is an emerging discipline that may revolutionise healthcare. 
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17 The influence of “intelligent” technologies on the way we 
discover and experience music 
Fabien Gouyon  
Pandora  
17.1 Statement 
There is an influential loop between technological innovation, the development of 
business models governing the music industry, and the way we discover and experience 
music. 
Internet and internet music streaming transformed the music industry. Streaming is now 
the primary way we listen to music, and this transformation is only at its beginning.  
Until recently, the way we listened to recorded music was tightly linked to a relatively 
clear business model. Namely, music discovery would be driven by diverse media (e.g. 
terrestrial radio), targeting a subsequent purchase and ownership of a physical —or 
digital— artifact of what was discovered, consumption being done via another media 
(e.g. personal CD-player, iPod, etc.). A whole industry (a multi-billion dollar industry) 
was based on that model, which is now put under pressure. 
Under this ownership model, once the discovery phase happens and an item is 
purchased, the job of content creators, producers and distributors is basically done. It is 
the listener who decides how and when to enjoy their music, with little influence from 
who produced or distributed it. 
Now, with the advent of streaming, we are witnessing a shift from ownership to access. 
And with the access model, the line between discovery and consumption is now blurred, 
as the same media now serves both. There is an opportunity for content producers and 
distributors to guide listeners in their consumption. This opens the way to a much more 
holistic experience. And in return, the listener now requires to be assisted in all aspects 
from search, discovery, browsing, sorting through enormous collections of tracks, 
consumption, sharing, etc. That leaves room for many different novel models of listening 
experiences.  
This is precisely where a crucial part of the music streaming industrial competition is 
currently happening. Diverse companies are developing at great speed new products, 
such as personalized playlists, radio-like lean-back propositions, etc., aiming at defining 
new formats of music listening. This calls for developing new technologies for 
recommending the most relevant content, as well as the most relevant vehicle for 
content discovery and consumption.  
Such technologies must have the potential to be personalized for all listeners and 
reactive in real-time, and they must balance many factors such as e.g. content 
repetition, interactivity, or user intent. 
In other words, the current developments in the music industry that are primarily driven 
by technological innovation are shaping the way hundredth of millions will access music, 
experience it and socialize around it. It is therefore fair to say that researchers and 
technological companies alike should acknowledge their strong cultural and societal 
responsibilities, and even further, embrace them.  
Let’s consider a few examples. For instance our responsibilities with the listener: The 
ubiquitous availability of (almost) any artefact of the world's music repertoire only a few 
clicks away imply overwhelming choices to music lovers. They need assistance, and we 
have a responsibility in helping them navigating through, and filtering this flood of 
content. Recommendation and personalization technologies can help in this endeavour. 
But they also are prone to potential algorithmic biases, and can result in a progressive 
isolation of users in their own musical bubbles, hence limiting and ultimately hurting their 
experience.  
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Let’s now consider responsibilities with the music ecosystem, which we are part of: The 
fact is, music distribution is extremely unbalanced: a very small proportion of artists (the 
“head” of the distribution) account for most of what’s listened to, while the large majority 
of artists (the “tail”) remain listened by few. There are hits, and there are niches. We 
should carefully consider the effect technology can have on this distribution. It is 
(relatively) easy to develop technology that could —directly or indirectly— have a 
favourable distribution impact on either the “tail” or the “head”. These would likely result 
in different economic returns for the industry and for the artists, on the short-term and 
on the long-term.  
Finally, let’s also consider that technological innovation is not only influencing the music 
listener experience as exemplified above, but it is in fact currently revolutionizing most 
aspects of the music industry, from creation, to rights monitoring, marketing, 
monetization, etc. This could spark similar reflexions on our cultural and societal 
responsibilities as developers of these technologies. 
17.2 Challenges 
 How, in the development of innovative technologies, can we exhaustively identify, 
understand and deal with algorithmic biases? 
 How can we devise metrics that would approximate long-term user satisfaction? 
 How can we make algorithms (e.g. recommendation algorithms) more transparent to 
their users? And what degree of transparency is actually desired/required? 
 How can we balance ever more adaptive, contextual user experiences and respect for 
privacy? How can we provide users with more control on the data they provide us?  
 What level of trust between a user and a technology/service is desirable to achieve? 
How far can the interaction go, and are there limits to be fixed?  
 In the current context of extremely fast-paced scientific and technological 
developments, a very competitive and dynamic music streaming industry, and the 
"all-you-can-consume” nature of modern media, how can we help users cope with the 
overwhelming flood of content and products, and help them engage more deeply with 
content? 
 What should be the basic methodological steps to follow so that the novel technology 
we develop not only follows to the latest technological trend, and responds to 
business metrics, but also empowers its users in its very evolution? 
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18 HumanAI 
Blagoj Delipetrev 
Digital Economy Unit, Joint Research Center, European Commission 
18.1 Statement 
Human and Machine intelligence comparison 
There have been millions of year of biological evolution. Almost three billions years was 
needed for evolution to create the current human being. Evolution has increased human 
brain size exponentially over the last 8 million years from below 250 cc to 1500 cc. The 
brain is the source of our intelligence and separates us from all other species.  
The industrial revolution, 2-3 centuries ago, produced machines that replaced physical 
human labour. The computational machines started 70 years ago with the 
semiconductors and their exponential grow which leaded to the creation of artificial 
intelligence (AI) which replaced humans in cognitive tasks.  
The most important point is the time scale. Both human and machine evolutions are 
exponential and while human evolution is in millions of years, the machine evolution is in 
decades. There is a distinctive difference between human intelligence and the current AI, 
but this may not be the case in the future. Moore law is not dead, and the machine rise 
continues. 
Deep Learning  
Deep learning (DL) is the flagship of the AI research and achievements in the last 
decade. Increased computational power and vast amounts of digital data are foundation 
for DL, which is in essence a multiple layer neural network. DL achieved many 
breakthroughs, starting from vastly improving image recognition, NLP or translation. The 
DL combined with Reinforcement learning (RL) won the game of GO, Atari, Poker and 
lastly Dota. DL and RL are rapidly expanding.   
Algorithmic Impact Assessment  
The AI fast pace produced many systems that are used in everyday lives, government 
and public offices. There is a need of validation of these AI systems. Worldwide various 
initiatives for algorithm impact assessment will evaluate and analyse AI systems and 
their decisions and make them more transparent, understandable and explainable.  
Predictions  
My predictions are that “everything electrified will be cognified”, “AI is the new 
electricity” making devices more intelligent and autonomous. Tasks described in 
productivity and efficiency will be performed by robots and bots. Now and in near future 
AI is going to complement us in all our daily tasks, as they do already, with our 
smartphone, computers, etc. In the middle term, the more advanced and intelligent 
machines will completely replace humans in tasks like transportation, medical image 
recognition, language translation, etc. In the long term is possible to have AGI or 
something close to it that will be capable of doing multiple cognitive tasks better than 
human does. This does not mean that humans will be obsolete.  
In the meantime, we need to address many current problems and possible AI dangers. 
One of the most vivid dangers is autonomous weapons. Other highly important topics are 
the rising inequality, unemployment, fairness, inclusion, social justice, etc.   
18.2 Challenges 
The world is on the verge of one of its most valued discoveries AI. There are huge 
benefits in rising productivity, efficiency, improved standard, longer lifespan, better 
healthcare, etc. AI will automate most of the tasks, leaving more time for humans to 
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enjoy lives and be creative. AI can bring more happiness and prosperity but also dead 
and destruction. Therefore, there is a need for AI regulation for the benefit of all 
humanity.    
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19 Do humans know which AI applications they do need? 
Perfecto Herrera 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Escola Superior de Música de Catalunya  
In the last century, humans have developed powerful technologies that, for the first time 
in history have the potential to quickly and irreversibly change the world as it was 
previously known. Nuclear power and genetic engineering are application areas derived 
from useful essential knowledge (which cannot be questioned or censored) that had to be 
subject to ethical and legal regulation, even by means of international agreements. The 
current state of our knowledge on AI makes some of their applications to be about to 
cross (or maybe already crossing) red lines too and there have been attempts to reach a 
consensus, at least in the scientific community (see for example: 
https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/ or http://www.iiia.csic.es/barcelonadeclaration/).  
In the panel on the application domains of AI that closed our kickoff-meeting we 
witnessed some of such concerns, but also other ones that have to do with our concepts 
of humanity or creativity. 
Sergi Jordà, in “Enhancing or mimicking human (musical) creativity? The bright and dark 
sides of the Moon” debated on attempts to develop “creative machines” and how many of 
them cannot shed enough light on human creative or other cognitive processes (one of 
the goals or justifications of some AI practitioners). In addition, creative systems are 
usually deprecated by their potential users (flesh-endowed music creators), not to 
mention the shallowness or uninterestingness of their outputs (though some outstanding 
exceptions could be considered). This rejection of creative systems could be due to a 
narrow developing perspective that does not consider the human to be inside a loop with 
the AI system. The idea of computers as assistants, becoming extensions of their users 
and doing the “dirty” or the short-time unfeasible work, should be promoted and 
researched (instead of leaving them the option to make the serious decisions). This is 
something that Luc Steels, another of the panel participants, commented during the 
panel dialogue (“Intelligence amplification” was the short-name given to that). A final 
issue with creative systems, but also with other AI devoted to “practical” problem-solving 
is that of understanding the outputs and the inner workings leading to them, from a 
human perspective, as some participants also remarked with the special case of game-
playing AI systems. 
The idea of assisting humans when dealing with creation is also challenging when they 
are not the creators but they enjoy an artistic creation, as Fabien Gouyon in “The 
influence of intelligent technologies on the way we discover and experience music” 
remarked (see Section 17). The almost permanent connection we listeners currently have 
with music, as a stream passing by or where you live immersed into, calls for ways to 
improve such listening experiences in “intelligent” ways (recommending truly relevant 
titles, helping to navigate through options, personalizing musical experiences, connecting 
with other people or groups, etc.).  
Biases already noticed in other types of recommenders, and the potential construction of 
isolation bubbles on the side of users, should be carefully counter-acted in order to keep 
the collective and transformative power of music at its best. 
A very different perspective and application field was discussed in “Machine learning in 
healthcare and computer-assisted treatment” by Miguel-Ángel González-Ballester (see 
Section 16), where advantages and shortcomings of current medical AI systems, 
especially those devoted to image-based diagnosis, were discussed. Here, again, the 
requirement that machine decisions can be interpretable under human (professional) 
criteria was raised. Additionally, the possibility that diagnosis might be done without 
humans in the loop (or that machines could bias or override the view and expertise 
brought by them) has also to be considered. An emergent topic, for which we are 
probably unprepared yet, was AI embodiment (i.e., what happens when humans 
incorporate, as body parts, AI systems?). Intersecting several of already mentioned hot 
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issues, Blagoj Delipetrev, in “HumanAI How to assess algorithmic impact?” compared 
human and machine intelligence remarking what should not be considered as such (brute 
force approaches) and ways humans and machines could collaborate for a human-
favourable scenario (see Section 18). He also discussed applications in satellite image 
recognition and on the assessment of the impact of AI algorithms. The necessity to deal 
with natural language and concept generalization before claiming “intelligence” for many 
AI systems was relevantly remarked there.  
Our last talk, “Will AI lead to digital immortality?”, by Luc Steels, speculated on future or 
“futuristic” applications and issues. Personal assistants are currently being developed 
under different appearances, and they will probably become autonomous artificial 
personae that might even impersonate different humans at the same time, not to 
mention that they might have multiple parallel lives, or that they will become immortal 
and then can continue with functions attributed to their formerly-assisted human beings. 
A list of ethical issues open by that perspective was barely touched, although, compared 
with those that the current intensively-used systems pose, they could be left for some 
future HUMAINT version 2. 
During the open debate other important topics were lightly touched such as the apparent 
overabundance of AI-based start-up companies without clear business models (which can 
contribute to the “hype” of the topic), the risk of being monitored in concealed ways (by 
sound recording devices intended to play with toys or to just receive commands), the 
direct manipulation of behaviour that recommenders or notification services induce in 
their users, the blurring between what we thought reality is (or was) and what our 
senses are processing, the losing of some skills (some of them considered to be 
inherently human, such as caring for other beings, for example), or the consented (or 
worryingly ignored) externalization of some of our decision-making processes. 
Applications of AI could sometimes be perceived as harmful because of their apparent 
extraordinary or superhuman “intelligence” but their most worrying aspects should be 
watched elsewhere: the difficulties to track or explain their decisions, the difficulties to 
embed AI systems with some moral sense or the subtle or blatant invasion of privacy 
they can facilitate. Even though there are enough examples of AI systems contributing to 
a healthier and more pleasurable existence (i.e., diagnosis systems, helpers for autistic 
or elderly people) and that such systems can help us to cope with data overload and 
strive in an increasingly complex reality, we should be watchful for some forthcoming 
large-scale disruption on the way we see ourselves and the surrounding world.  
It’s time to decide how our future should look like, instead of leaving it to be 
devised just by what technology makes possible. 
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Part V: Considerations and conclusions   
In this part, we first include a set of written contributions by other scholars that were not 
presented at the workshop but provided relevant input for our final considerations.  
Then, we provide a set of conclusions to the workshop and directions for future work in 
the HUMAINT project.  
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20 Characterising the trajectories of artificial and natural 
intelligence 
José Hernández-Orallo 
Universitat Politècnica de València 
Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence.  
20.1 State of the art: An Atlas of Intelligence 
The comparison between artificial and human intelligence is usually done in an informal 
and subjective way, often leading to contradicting assessments (Kirsh 1991, Hayles 
1996, Brooks 1997, Pfeifer 2001, Shah et al 2016, Lake et al. 2017, Tegmark 2017, 
Marcus 2018). This is especially problematic because of the pace of the epistemological 
change. Our understanding of intelligence is rapidly progressing from new discoveries in 
comparative cognition, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. However, there is a 
possibly more relevant ontological change: artificial intelligence is creating new kinds of 
systems, and it is hence extending the landscape of intelligence (Sloman, 1984). 
Moreover, it is still not fully recognised —and certainly not well understood— that these 
technological changes are also affecting human cognition. Put it simply: because of AI, 
humans now think differently. Overall, and by all means, we have a moving target 
problem. Can we anticipate these trajectories? 
In the first place, we need ways of assessing what AI systems can do, what they will be 
able to do in the near future, and the pathways and resources that will be needed to get 
there. Indeed, we need a common framework to determine which kinds of AI or hybrid 
systems in this landscape of intelligence are even desirable (needed for society) or 
possibly undesirable (dangerous, too similar to some profession profiles, animals or 
humans, etc.). For a recent symposium about this see: http://kindsofintelligence.org/. 
The discussion must not be limited to the way society is affected: the irruption of AI 
systems with new capabilities may trigger a range of alterations in the very way human 
cognition works. The changes in memory capabilities, development trajectories and 
learning patterns that we are already observing because of the use of technology 
(negative Flynn effect, Google effect, etc.) can distinctly be regarded as cognitive atrophy 
or enhancement, but are about to change our psychometric profiles in possibly radical 
ways. 
The Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence (http://lcfi.ac.uk) is working on a 
new initiative, an atlas of intelligence, to cover a relevant portion of the past, present 
and future landscape of intelligence: including humans, non-human animals, AI systems, 
hybrids and collectives thereof.   
The atlas will be based on a set of dimensions, either behavioural features (i.e., the 
functionalities, cognitive abilities and personality traits) or physical features (i.e., the 
mechanisms, kinds of sensors and actuators, body morphology, computational or 
neurological resources). The atlas will allow users to make several projections and 
aggregations to a smaller number of dimensions. Also, despite the framework not being 
hierarchical, once populated, it could be converted into different kinds of taxonomies by 
using different distance/similarity metrics (as homology or analogy have been used for 
living systems) and also exploring a continuum from specialised (task-specific) systems 
to more general (task-independent) systems, including a developmental perspective. 
The initiative is at an early stage and we welcome associates and contributors. More 
information about the specification and prospective maps to be considered for the atlas 
can be found in (Bhatnagar et al. 2017, 2018). 
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20.2 Challenges 
 How can we characterise current and future AI systems in terms of cognitive abilities 
(Hernández-Orallo 2017a,b) and compare them to humans? 
o Are the new evaluation platforms (Castelvecchi 2016, Hernández-Orallo et al. 
2017) going in the right direction? How do the AI milestones relate or compare 
to the milestones in child development or animal evolution? 
o Can we develop an ability-oriented analysis of job automation rather than 
task-oriented (Frey and Osborne 2017, Brynjolfsson and Mitchell 2017)? 
 How can we characterise the changes in human cognition originating from technology 
and, most especially, from the interaction, replacement or enhancement with AI 
systems? 
o How can we analyse the locations and trajectories of human intelligence and 
AI progress? 
o How can the new “cognitive ecosystems” (Hutchins 2010), including humans 
and machines, be affected by these future changes of intelligence and their 
effect on dominance topologies (Cave 2017, de Weerd et al. 2017)? 
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21 Considerations related to cognitive development children 
Nuria Sebastian  
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
My comments will turn around two issues, both related to the concept of “development” 
that complements the current views. 
21.1 Differences in machinery 
There is a fundamental difference between “Artificial Intelligence” and “Human 
Intelligence” related to the enormous changes that the Human hardware (the brain) 
undergoes during life. Comparatively, artificial hardware undergoes relatively small 
changes (and the changes are not just in its size, but also in qualitative aspects). 
The architecture of the human brain changes in fundamental dimensions during life. The 
most dramatic changes take place during the first years of life (I will not refer to prenatal 
changes / learning, because the point I want to make does not require to address this 
period, but there is learning during this time). The number of neurons increases 
exponentially mostly prenatally, but the number of synapses changes in a complex way 
after birth.  It is worth noticing that changes do not take place in an uniform way across 
the brain. In general, sensory-related areas develop very quickly (reaching adult levels 
by the end of the first year of life), while “thinking-planning” areas (frontal areas) reach 
adult levels after puberty. On top of complex changes in the number of synapses, the 
amount of myelination (related to the effectiveness of neural transmission) diminishes 
with age (though it does not disappear). 
These specific patterns impose important constraints the way the brain processes the 
inputs it receives. An important feature of brain development is the extraordinary 
synchronization between maturation of different brain areas: they become functional 
when they are needed. For instance: association areas become functional when “lower” 
areas are effective: there is no energy waste by having areas “waiting” for appropriate 
inputs. Functionality is the product of an exquisite interplay between internal 
development (gene-regulated, more prevalent early in life) and external input (more 
prevalent late in life). 
On top of these substantial hardware changes, there are other important development-
related changes in neurotransmitters and hormones that will have dramatic 
consequences on the way the brain functions across life. A clear case is the changes in 
sleep patterns taking place in life. Newborns spend most of their time sleeping, while 
elderly people tend to sleep very few hours. There are fundamental changes in the way 
the brain functions during sleep (not only quantitative, but also qualitatively) and it is 
well-known the critical importance of sleep in memory-consolidation. 
Finally, newborns (from 4 hours to 4 days of age) and very young infants are able to 
perform complex computation over different types of signals (that seem to be relatively 
experience-independent). For instance, newborns can notice the difference between 
some (human) languages, such as Dutch and Japanese, if played forwards, but not 
backwards (as other species such as cotton-top tamarin monkeys and long evans rats). 
It is not until 5 months of age that human infants can distinguish English from Dutch, or 
Spanish from Catalan (it is worth noticing that by six months, infants already know 
several words). In a different domain, newborns prefer to orient to stimuli with a human 
face configuration than to a random one (Morton and Johnson, 1991).  
In summary, there are essential differences between human and artificial “hardware” and 
they entail critical specificities regarding human learning. 
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21.2 Developmental changes in interaction with computers 
The presentations have assumed that users interacting with AI systems are adults. 
However, there are important differences in the way children and adults deal with 
artificial systems, and this is an under-studied field. 
One of the few existing studies has investigated the well-known Uncanny Valley effect. 
There is a vast literature investigating the fact that (human) adults feel uncomfortable 
when interacting with very human-like avatars/robots. 
 
Figure 5. Uncanny Valley effect. 
There is evidence indicating that such effect may be acquired. Young children (under 9 
years) do not find “creepy” such very human-like avatars, importantly the feeling of 
“creepiness” is related to children’s assumption that such avatars have human-like minds 
(Brink, Gray and Wellman, 2017).  
The investigation of how children interact with machines is a virtually unexplored field. 
Such investigations are critical when considering the use of AI and robots in educational 
(and health) environments. 
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22 The tyranny of data? The bright and dark sides of 
algorithmic decision making for public policy making 
Nuria Oliver 
Vodafone Research and Datapop alliance  
22.1 Statement: Data-driven Algorithms for Public Policy Making  
Today's vast and unprecedented availability of large-scale human behavioral data is 
profoundly changing the world we live in. Massive streams of data are available to train 
algorithms which, combined with increased analytical and technical capabilities, are 
enabling researchers, companies, governments and other public sector actors to resort to 
data-driven machine learning-based algorithms to tackle complex problems (Gillespie, 
2014). Many decisions with significant individual and societal implications previously 
made by humans alone --often by experts-- are now made or assisted by algorithms, 
including hiring, lending (Khandani et al., 2010), policing (Wang et al., 2013), criminal 
sentencing (Barry-Jester et al., 2015), and stock trading. Data-driven algorithmic 
decision making may enhance overall government efficiency and public service delivery, 
by optimizing bureaucratic processes, providing real-time feedback and predicting 
outcomes (Sunstein, 2012). In a recent book with the evocative and provocative title 
``Technocracy in America", international relations expert Parag Khanna argued that a 
data-driven direct technocracy is a superior alternative to today's (alleged) 
representative democracy, because it may dynamically capture the specific needs of the 
people while avoiding the distortions of elected representatives and corrupt middlemen  
(Khanna, 2017). Human decision making has often shown significant limitations and 
extreme bias in public policy, resulting in inefficient and/or unjust processes and 
outcomes (Fiske, 1998; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1998). The turn towards data-
driven algorithms can be seen as a reflection of a demand for greater objectivity, 
evidence-based decision-making, and a better understanding of our individual and 
collective behaviors and needs. 
At the same time, scholars and activists have pointed to a range of social, ethical and 
legal issues associated with algorithmic decision-making, including bias and 
discrimination (Barocas and Selbst , 2016; Ramirez et al., 2016) and lack of 
transparency and accountability (Citron and Pasquale, 2014; Pasquale, 2015; Zarsky, 
2016). For example, Barocas and Selbst (2016) showed that the use of algorithmic 
decision making processes could result in disproportionate adverse outcomes for 
disadvantaged groups, in ways suggestive of discrimination. Algorithmic decisions can 
reproduce and magnify patterns of discrimination, due to decision makers' prejudices or 
reflect the biases present in the society. A recent study by ProPublica of the COMPAS 
Recidivism Algorithm (an algorithm used to inform criminal sentencing decisions by 
predicting recidivism) found that the algorithm was significantly more likely to label black 
defendants than white defendants, despite similar overall rates of prediction accuracy 
between the two groups (Angwin et al., 2016). Along this line, a nominee for the National 
Book Award, Cathy O'Neil's book, ``Weapons of Math Destruction", details several case 
studies on harms and risks to public accountability associated with big data-driven 
algorithmic decision-making, particularly in the areas of criminal justice and education. 
In 2014, the White House released a report titled ``Big Data: Seizing opportunities, 
preserving values''10 highlighting the discriminatory potential of Big Data, including how it 
could undermine longstanding civil rights protections governing the use of personal 
information for credit, education, health, safety, employment, etc. 
For example, data-driven algorithmic decisions about applicants for jobs, schools or 
credit may be affected by hidden biases that tend to flag individuals from particular 
demographic groups as unfavorable for such opportunities. Such outcomes can be self-
                                           
10https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20150204_Big_Data_Seizing_Opportunities_Pr
eserving_Values_Memo.pdf 
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reinforcing, since systematically reducing individuals' access to credit, employment and 
education will worsen their situation, and play against them in future applications. For 
this reason, a subsequent White House report called for ``equal opportunity by design" 
as a guiding principle in those domains. Furthermore, the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, in partnership with Microsoft Research and others, has co-hosted 
several public symposiums on the impacts and challenges of algorithms and Artificial 
Intelligence, specifically relating to social inequality, labor, healthcare and ethics11 
At the heart of the matter is the fact that technology outpaces policy in most cases; here, 
governance mechanisms of algorithms have not kept pace with technological 
development. Several researchers have recently argued that current control frameworks 
are not adequate for situations in which a potentially unfair or incorrect decision is made 
by a computer (Barocas and Selbst, 2016).  
Fortunately, there is increasing awareness of the detrimental effects of discriminatory 
biases and opacity of some data-driven algorithmic decision-making systems, and of the 
need to reduce or eliminate them. A number of research and advocacy initiatives are 
worth noting, including the Data Transparency Lab12, a ``community of technologists, 
researchers, policymakers and industry representatives working to advance online 
personal data transparency through research and design", and the DARPA Explainable 
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) project13. A tutorial on the subject was held at the 2016 ACM 
Knowledge and Data Discovery conference (Hajian et al., 2016). Researchers from New 
York University's Information Law Institute --such as Helen Nissenbaum and Solon 
Barocas-- and Microsoft Research --such as Kate Crawford and Tarleton Gillespie-- have 
held several workshops and conferences these past few years on the ethical and legal 
challenges related to algorithmic governance and decision-making14.  
This chapter is a summary of the content discussed by Lepri et al. (2017a, 2017b), where 
the authors highlight the need for social good decision-making algorithms (i.e. algorithms 
strongly influencing decision-making and resource optimization of public goods, such as 
public health, safety, access to finance and fair employment) to provide transparency and 
accountability, to only use personal information --created, owned and controlled by 
individuals-- with explicit consent, to ensure that privacy is preserved when data is 
analyzed in aggregated and anonymized form, and to be tested and evaluated in context 
by means of living lab approaches involving citizens. 
The opportunity to significantly improve the processes leading to decisions that affect 
millions of lives is huge. As researchers and citizens, I believe that we should not miss on 
this opportunity. Hence, I would like to encourage the larger community --researchers, 
practitioners, policy makers-- in a variety of fields --computer science, sociology, 
economics, ethics, law-- to join forces so we can address today's limitations in data-
driven decision-making and contribute to fairer and more transparent decisions with clear 
accountability, within an ethical framework and developed by diverse teams so they can 
achieve significant positive impact. 
22.2 Challenges 
There are several limitations and risks in the use of data-driven predictive models 
informing decisions that might impact the daily lives of millions of people. Namely: 
21.2.1. Discrimination: Algorithmic discrimination may arise from different sources. 
First, input data into algorithmic decisions may be poorly weighted, leading to disparate 
impact. For example, as a form of indirect discrimination, overemphasis of zip code 
within predictive policing algorithms can lead to the association of low-income African-
American neighborhoods with areas of crime and as a result, the application of specific 
                                           
11 https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/05/03/preparing-future-artificial-intelligence 
12 http://www.datatransparencylab.org/ 
13 http://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence 
14 http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/ili/algorithmsconference 
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targeting based on group membership (Christin et al., 2015). Second, discrimination can 
occur from the decision to use an algorithm itself. Categorization can be considered as a 
form of direct discrimination, whereby algorithms are used for disparate treatment 
(Diakopoulos, 2015). Third, algorithms can lead to discrimination as a result of the 
misuse of certain models in different contexts (Calders and Zliobaite, 2013). Fourth, in a 
form of feedback loop, biased training data can be used both as evidence for the use of 
algorithms and as proof of their effectiveness (Calders and Zliobaite, 2013). The use of 
algorithmic data-driven decision processes may also result in individuals being denied 
opportunities based not on their own action but on the actions of others with whom they 
share some characteristics. For example, some credit card companies have lowered a 
customer's credit limit, not based on the customer's payment history, but rather based 
on analysis of other customers with a poor repayment history that had shopped at the 
same establishments where the customer had shopped (Ramirez et al., 2016). 
While several proposals have been made in the literature to tackle algorithmic 
discrimination and maximize fairness, we feel the urgency to establish a call for action 
bringing together researchers from different fields (including law, ethics, political 
philosophy and machine learning) to devise, evaluate and validate in the real-world 
alternative fairness metrics for different tasks. In addition to this empirical research, we 
believe it will be necessary to propose a modeling framework --supported by empirical 
evidence-- that would assist practitioners and policy makers in making decisions aided by 
algorithms that are maximally fair. 
21.2.2. Lack of Transparency/Opacity: Transparency, which refers to the 
understandability of a specific model, can be a mechanism that facilitates accountability. 
More specifically, transparency can be considered at the level of the entire model, at the 
level of individual components (e.g. parameters), and at the level of a specific algorithm. 
In the strictest sense, a model is transparent if a person can contemplate the entire 
model at once. Thus, models should be characterized by low computational complexity. A 
second and less strict notion of transparency might be that each part of the model (e.g. 
each input, parameter, and computation) admits an intuitive explanation. A final notion 
of transparency might apply at the level of the algorithm, even without the ability to 
simulate an entire model or to intuit the meaning of its components. However, the ability 
to access and analyze behavioral data about customers and citizens on an unprecedented 
scale gives corporations and governments powerful means to reach and influence 
segments of the population through targeted marketing campaigns and social control 
strategies. In particular, we are witnessing an information and knowledge asymmetry 
situation where a powerful few have access and use resources and tools that the majority 
do not have access to, thus leading to an --or exacerbating the existing-- asymmetry of 
power between the state and big companies on one side and the people on the other 
side, conceptualized as a “digital divide" (Boyd and Crawford, 2012). In addition, the 
nature and use of various data-driven algorithms for social good, as well as the lack of 
computational or data literacy among citizens (Bhargava et al., 2015), makes algorithmic 
transparency difficult to generalize and accountability difficult to assess (Pasquale, 2015). 
Burrell (2016) has provided a useful framework to characterize three different types of 
opacity in algorithmic decision-making: (1) intentional opacity, whose objective is the 
protection of the intellectual property of the inventors of the algorithms. This type of 
opacity could be mitigated with legislation that would force decision-makers towards the 
use of open source systems. The new General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) in the 
EU with a “right to an explanation" starting in May of 2018 is an example of such 
legislation. But powerful commercial and governmental interests will make it difficult to 
eliminate intentional opacity; (2) illiterate opacity, due to the fact that the vast majority 
of people lack the technical skills to understand the underpinnings of algorithms and 
machine learning models built from data. This kind of opacity might be attenuated with 
stronger education programs in computational thinking and “algorithmic literacy" and by 
enabling independent experts to advise those affected by algorithmic decision-making; 
and (3) intrinsic opacity, which arises by the nature of certain machine learning methods 
that are difficult to interpret (e.g. deep learning models). This opacity is well known in 
the machine learning community (usually referred to as the interpretability problem).  
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21.2.3. Computational violations of privacy: Reports and studies (Ramirez et al., 
2016) have focused on the misuse of personal data disclosed by users and on the 
aggregation of data from different sources by entities playing as data brokers with direct 
implications in privacy. An often overlooked element is that the computational 
developments coupled with the availability of novel sources of behavioral data (e.g. social 
media data) now allow inferences about private information that may never have been 
disclosed. This element is essential to understand the issues raised by these algorithmic 
approaches, as has become apparent in the recent Facebook/Cambridge Analytica data 
scandal15.  
21.2.4. Data Literacy: It is of paramount importance that we devote resources to 
computational and data literacy programs aimed at all citizens, from children to the 
elderly. Otherwise, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for us collectively as a 
society to make informed decisions about technologies that are not fully understood 
(Bhargava et al., 2015).  
21.2.5. Unclear accountability: As more decisions that affect the lives of thousands of 
people are automatically made by algorithms, we need clarity on who is responsible for 
the decisions made by them or with algorithmic support. Transparency is generally 
thought as a key enabler of accountability. However, transparency and auditing do not 
necessarily suffice for accountability. In fact, in a recent paper Kroll et al. (2017) have 
introduced computational methods able to provide accountability even when some 
information is kept hidden.  
21.2.6. Lack of ethical frameworks: Data-driven algorithmic decision-making poses 
important ethical dilemmas regarding what would be an appropriate course of action to 
take based on the inferences carried out by the algorithms or on the specific situation 
that the algorithm is acting upon. Hence, practitioners, developers, researchers and 
policy makers who would use data-driven algorithms to support or automatically make 
decisions would need to ensure that such decisions are made in accordance with a pre-
defined and commonly accepted ethical framework. There are several examples of ethical 
principles proposed in the literature for this purpose1617 and institutes and research 
centers, such as the Digital Ethics Lab in Oxford or the AI Now Institute at NYU. 
However, it is an open question how to properly incorporate ethical principles in data-
driven algorithmic decision making processes in addition to ensuring that all the 
developers and professionals involved comply with a clear Code of Conduct and Ethics. 
21.2.7. Lack of diversity: Given the broad set of use cases that data-driven algorithms 
might be apply to, it is important to reflect on the diversity of the teams that generated 
such algorithms. To date, the development of the state-of-the-art data-driven, machine 
learning-based algorithms has been carried out by somewhat homogeneous groups of 
computer scientists. Moving forward, we need to ensure that the teams are diverse both 
in terms of areas of expertise and demographics –particularly gender.  
 
                                           
15 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook%E2%80%93Cambridge_Analytica_data_scandal 
16 https://www.wired.com/story/should-data-scientists-adhere-to-a-hippocratic-oath/ 
17 https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/ 
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Figure 6. Summary of requirements for positive data-driven disruption. 
While this is an exciting time for researchers and practitioners in this new field of 
computational social sciences, we need to be aware of the risks associated with these 
new approaches to decision making, including violation of privacy, lack of transparency 
and diversity, information and knowledge asymmetry, social exclusion and 
discrimination. I would like to highlight three human-centric requirements that we 
consider to be of paramount importance to enable positive disruption of data-driven 
policy-making: user-centric data ownership and management; algorithmic transparency 
and accountability; and living labs to experiment with data-driven policies in the wild. It 
will be only when we honor these requirements that we will be able to move from the 
feared tyranny of data and algorithms to a data-enabled model of democratic governance 
running against tyrants and autocrats, and for the people. 
For the readers interested in the topic, they can find an extended version of this chapter 
in (Lepri et al., 2017a; Lepri et al., 2017b).  
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23 Quantum Computing and Machine Learning 
Antonio Puertas Gallardo 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission  
Wide sectors of the industry and world economy are demanding more computing power 
and those needs are actually of a new king of computation. A growing request for High 
Performance Computing (or supercomputing) power exist amidst many areas (Finance, 
Chemistry, Pharma-industry, Nuclear fusion research), Big data and Artificial Intelligence, 
in general. The more digitalization of the economy increases, the higher is the request for 
a bigger and different type of supercomputing. Increasingly more systems and devices 
are clustering together, collecting data, in what is called the dawn of the Internet of 
things (IoT). Artificial intelligence processors are discovering mind-blowing levels of 
correlations or formulating inferences in huge amount of data, but still there are plenty of 
signals that a considerable numbers of companies are looking for new supercomputing 
paradigms. Classical computers (and supercomputer) are very big calculators that 
performed very well doing calculus and analytics using step-by-step operations, however 
quantum computing will be focused on the solution of problems from a more complex 
and higher point of view.  
 
Figure 7. Areas of interest for Quantum Computing18 
The capacity of data stored worldwide is increasing by 20 % on a yearly basis (nowadays 
is ranging in the order of hundredths of Exabytes) and is a compelling force to discover 
new approaches to Artificial Intelligence (Machine Learning).  An encouraging new 
concept in computation is been now investigated by the most prominent IT companies 
research laboratories and Academic world, is the forthcoming and hypothetical utilization 
of quantum computing for the optimization of the algorithms of classic machine learning. 
Quantum computing will not render the classic computers inappropriate. Personal 
computers, notebooks and smartphones will still be running on silicon-processors for the 
likely future and the changeover may possibly take several years. Quantum computing 
might be the boosting element of the new "Fourth Industrial Revolution", likewise it 
might be, for example, a driver for the development of new molecules for drugs, the 
discovering of new materials and boost Machine learning algorithms that could not have 
been developed before with traditional computers. 
 
                                           
18 Source IBM 
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23.1 What is quantum computing?   
A classical computer encodes information in the elementary unit of a logical bit, which 
can take values either "0" or "1", this information is stored and processed in the way of 
strings of bits (binary bits). Those individuals bit can have only one of two values: either 
0 or 1. A quantum computer encodes information in the so called quantum bits or 
"qubits" each of them can simultaneously encode both logical bits "0" and "1" at once. 
This behaviour makes a quantum computer intrinsically parallel. The way to storage and 
process information in parallel, make some mathematical operations exponentially wide 
faster related to the computational speeds of classical computers for solving the same 
kind of problems.                 
Quantum computation exploits a quantum physics phenomenon called "superposition" 
which allows to a qubit (or quantum system in general) to be in a superposition of more 
than one state (not only "0" or "1" as conventional computers) at the same time. The 
differences between classical and quantum computers can be explained with the help of a 
coin.  In classical computing, information is stored in bits with two states, either 0 or 1 – 
(or heads or tails). In quantum computing, information is stored in quantum bits 
("qubits") that can be any state between 0 and 1 – similar to a spinning coin that can be 
both heads and tails at the same time. Among other advantages, a quantum computer 
makes computations by the manipulation of subatomic particles. These operations are 
faster and with lower energy consumption if compared with the classical computers.     
Nowadays, the methods and instruments of quantum algorithms are very well founded 
and encompass a high amount of remarkable models and standards that overcome and 
beat the best established classical methods (See figure 4). The achievement of quantum 
computing is arising with IBM and Righetti succeeding in making their quantum 
computers available on the cloud. Many people are convinced that is only a matter of 
time until several theoretical designs can be tested on real-life machines. The innovative 
research discipline of Quantum machine Learning might offer the possibility to disrupt 
future approaches of intelligent data processing. 
 
Figure 8. Computing science domains19 
23.2 What is the holy grail of quantum computing?    
Exponential acceleration 
In other words, a quantum computer would be able to compute at a much faster speed 
(exponentially faster) than a classical computer. This implies that classical algorithms, 
                                           
19 Quantum computing – weird science or the next computing revolution Morgan Stanley Research Report, August 2017 
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which would take years to solve on a current supercomputer, could take just hours or 
minutes on a quantum computer.  
23.3 Quantum Machine Learning 
Quantum computation and quantum information have enabled us to think physically 
about computation, and this approach has yielded many new and exciting capabilities for 
information processing.  Hence, it is possible to enable us to think physically (from a 
quantum physics point of view) about machine learning, especially about neural 
networks. The field of quantum machine learning explores how to devise and implement 
quantum software that could allow machine learning to perform faster than on classical 
computers. Quantum machine learning "QML" is the science and technology at the 
intersection of quantum information processing and machine learning.                            
To figure out the scientific research and work on quantum machine learning we need to 
consider it as a highway. On one side (one way), machine learning assists physicists to 
control and manipulate quantum effects and phenomena in labs. On the other side, 
quantum physics improves the implementation and performance of machine learning. In 
quantum machine learning, quantum algorithms are developed to solve typical problems 
of machine learning using the efficiency of quantum computing. This is usually done by 
adapting classical algorithms or their expensive subroutines to run on a potential 
quantum computer. The expectation is that in the near future, such machines will be 
commonly available for applications and can help to process the growing amounts of 
global information.  The emerging field also includes approaches vice versa, namely well-
established methods of machine learning that can help to extend and improve quantum 
information theory. 
Quantum learning algorithms have been realized in a host of experimental systems 
and cover a range of applications as: 
 Simultaneous spoken digit and speaker recognition and chaotic time-series 
prediction at data rates beyond a gigabyte per second (Brunner at al., 2013). 
 Neural networks have been realized using liquid state nuclear magnetic resonance 
(Neigovzen et al., 2009). 
 Defaulting on a chain of trapped ions, simulated a neural network with induced 
long range interactions (Pons et al., 2007). 
 Solving a Higgs optimization problem with quantum annealing for machine 
learning (Mott et al., 2017). 
 Quantum annealing versus classical machine learning applied to a simplified 
computational biology problem (Richard Y. Li, Rosa Di Felice et al, 2018) 
23.4 Challenges 
For the time being Quantum computing is still in transition between the Labs and the 
testing phase. This period is for the world of scientists and industry to focus on getting 
quantum-ready and to create a quantum-literate community who speaks quantum 
information language20 
 Artificial neural networks and machine learning have now reached a new era after 
several decades of improvement where applications are to explode in many fields of 
science, industry, and technology. The Emergent Quantum information technologies 
would eventually boost the impact on Artificial Intelligence. 
1. - Machine learning algorithms training times could be accelerated exponentially21. 
2. - Parallelization of codes would be the new normal. 
                                           
20 https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/learning-to-speak-quantum 
21 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4xBlSi_fOs 
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3. - Software development would be revolutionized as programmers should need to learn 
to make codes which manage all solutions at the same time (instantaneously, when the 
algorithms are deployed into the Hardware layer). 
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24 Conclusions and future work 
Emilia Gómez, Vicky Charisi, Bertin Martens, Marius Miron, Songül Tolan 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission 
This report has summarized the content of the 1st workshop on Human Behaviour and 
Machine Intelligence (HUMAINT), which provides an interdisciplinary view on the main 
challenges related to the study of the impact that machine intelligence will have on 
human behaviour and potential needs for policy intervention.  
During the workshop, we have identified several research challenges and directions that 
can be summarized in the following ten points: 
1. There are many fundamental differences between human and machine 
intelligence: consciousness, evolutionary history, embodiment, situated cognition and 
social intelligence. In fact, we often lack of a critical approach of intelligence: what it 
is, its role in characterising humanness, the articulation between intelligence, 
knowledge and power. For instance, intelligence is much more easily granted to 
machines than to humans in the current media landscape. Although there are major 
scientific advancements on the human brain and its computational modelling, this is 
an extremely complex endeavour and still far from current computational models 
used in AI application.  
2. There is not yet a full understanding of the inner workings of state-of-the-art 
deep neural networks. As a consequence, estimation errors might be unintuitive 
for humans and generalization capabilities cannot be assessed. This limits the 
scientific understanding of algorithms, the capability to recover from adversarial 
examples, and complicates human supervision in practical applications. It also raises 
serious questions regarding whether the goal of building humanlike intelligence is 
possible and desirable. We should monitor AI advancements and new computing 
paradigms (e.g. quantum computing).  
3. We need ways to evaluate what AI can do today and predict its potential future 
capabilities. We need to define evaluation frameworks that are meaningful and in 
naturalistic settings to match practical application contexts. In this respect, we should 
consider engineering best practices, impact assessment methods, user satisfaction 
and business metrics, in order to develop smart and transparent benchmarking 
strategies. We should train the next generation of machine learning developers to 
apply and communicate these strategies and follow best practices to AI evaluation. 
4. We need to advance on the explainability, accountability and transparency of 
algorithms in general and deep learning architectures in particular, both from a 
machine learning research perspective (including theoretical understanding and 
empirical evaluation) and from a user perspective, when these methods are exploited 
in a particular application context. Humans should develop a critical thinking with 
respect to machine intelligence, and in order to do that people need to achieve data 
and algorithm literacy, so that everyone can understand and challenge it. 
5. With respect to human vs machine intelligence, we should move from a competition 
to an interaction paradigm where we should research on best strategies for 
collaboration and synergies exploitation between both intelligences. For 
instance, we need to investigate on how biases can be identified in human behaviour 
and if algorithms could help to recover and correct this. Here we need to consider 
human(owner/developer)-machine-human(user) interactions, since machine 
intelligence is in fact a product of human intelligence.  
 
6. It is important to understand the interaction in the context of decision making, e.g. 
considering bias present in algorithms and humans and how machines can be used to 
overcome human bias rather than incorporate it. This is particularly relevant in 
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domains where decision making affects human welfare, e.g. in recruitment processes 
or the allocation of public funds. Also, we need to address how machines can affect 
human attention and strategies for humans to trust machines.  
7. We need to research on how the interaction with machines affects human 
intelligence and cognitive capacities, if changing or diminishing them. In addition, 
we should research on how artificial intelligence changes relations between humans 
and between humans and the environment. While recent literature is focusing on the 
interaction between AI systems and adults, there are important differences in the way 
children deal with artificial systems that should be further researched, being the 
next generation to come.  
8. Machine intelligence systems should be developed by humans in a responsible way. 
We should formalize and incorporate ethical principles in machine intelligence 
development and evaluation. We should also foster diversity (in terms of expertise 
and demographics, particularly gender), in teams that develop and are empowered 
with artificial intelligence to reflect varied perspectives into the developed systems. 
9. Machine intelligence has a wide range of potential economic implications. There are 
already major concerns about the impact on human employment, wages and income 
distribution. The growing information asymmetry between humans and intelligent 
machines, and the potential for moral hazard and exploitation of human cognitive 
biases, will affect human behaviour and welfare. Competition between machines with 
scalable information processing capacities and humans with limited capacities will 
induce systemic shifts, including in the institutional structures of human societies.  
10. There is a need to understand who controls the results of AI, what is done in AI, 
and for whom, and establish adequate forecasting, control mechanisms and legal 
provisions to anticipate and revert situations in which algorithms can be used 
against people's welfare, as well as establish adequate laws that ensure algorithms 
are used *for* people's welfare. 
Finally, these mentioned points can be applied in different application domains. In this 
respect, we concluded that there are some aspects of algorithms that can be analysed 
independently of the application context. For instance, we agreed that the potential 
construction of isolation bubbles on the side of users in music recommender systems 
should be carefully counter-acted in order to keep the collective and transformative 
power of music at its best. This is also shared in other domains.  
However, there are some other issues that should be considered for particular use 
cases. In terms of algorithmic transparency, for instance, the interpretability of 
algorithms is crucial in healthcare applications, while it can be less critical in music 
recommendation.   
All of this requires multidisciplinary thinking, diverse teams and future impact 
assessment, as we should be watchful for forthcoming disruption on the way we see 
ourselves and the surrounding world.  
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